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ABSTRACT
In the last decade several surveys have suggested that monetary motivation is
just one face of the diverse set of motivational drivers of employees’ behavior, and
sometimes it is not even the most powerful: indeed, they seem to be moved by dif-
ferent psychological motivations, such as peer motivation, the intrinsic desire to do
a good job, recognition, and so on. Behavioral and experimental economics incor-
porate these psychological elements into the standard agency theory, and provide
experimental evidence to support their relevance.
The aim of this dissertation is to explore the effects on employees’ behavior of
two of these psychological forces: intrinsic motivation and solidarity towards peers.
Chapter 1 is a review of the effects of the interaction between intrinsic motivation
and other motivational forces, both external (such as external interventions, so-
cial context, and externally set goals) and internal (such as subject’s identity and
achievement motives). The laboratory experiment presented in Chapter 2 investi-
gates the relation between intrinsic motivation, wage delegation, and performance,
with a twofold aim: 1) testing whether subjects who are delegated their wage choice
become more intrinsically motivated 2) exploring the different reactions to wage
delegation of differently motivated workers. Chapter 3 reproduces the cash posters
framework à la Homans (1953, 1954) in the laboratory, and it examines whether
employees are moved also by solidarity concerns towards their coworkers.
Keywords: Intrinsic motivation, Employee motivation, Rewards, Compensation,
Delegation, Experiment, Solidarity, Gift-exchange, Reciprocity.
JEL Classification: C91; D81; D91; J32; J33; M52; M54.
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INTRODUCTION
The employer-employee relationship has been usually analyzed within an agency
framework in which the employer/principal engages the employee/agent to act on
her behalf: since the agent’s interest usually diverges from the principal’s, the princi-
pal needs to propose a proper contract in order to induce the agent to act according
to her desires (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt,
1989; Prendergast, 1999). Since the agent’s behavior usually can not be monitored
nor enforced perfectly, the neoclassical solution to the agency problem is to incen-
tivize the agent’s desired actions: as a consequence of this intervention, the agent
perceives shirking from the induced behavior to be more costly, and his interests
become more aligned to the principal’s (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kreps, 1990).
Implicit in the standard agency problem and in the proposed solution are several
assumptions, among which three are worth highlighting for our purposes: that both
subjects are driven only by monetary motivations, they are perfectly selfish, and
that agents’ effort is positively and monotonically influenced by monetary compen-
sation1.
Looking at real world scenarios, these assumptions risk to be too simplistic to rep-
resent comprehensively an employer-employee relation: subjects’ behavior seems to
be moved by many other drivers that are disregarded by the standard agency the-
ory, and consequently a reward policy that is based only on monetary compensation
1For sake of completeness, the other assumptions made by the positive agency theory are: both
subjects are perfectly rational and there is common knowledge of rationality, principals are risk
neutral while agents are risk averse, their time preferences are calculable with an exponential
discount function, agents’ utility function depends negatively from the exerted effort (Wright et
al., 2001; Pepper and Gore, 2012).
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results to be inadequate. Indeed, as long as the employee’s effort is remunerated,
other needs do arise: for example the need of feeling treated fairly by the employer
and coworkers, the need of feeling trusted and motivated, the need of working in a
accommodating workplace, the need of feeling cared for by the employer with re-
wards that can be different from the pure monetary one (such as welfare policies,
health care, or housing allowances), and so on. Many consultancies (such as Willis
Towers Watson, McKinsey, Mazars) have attempted to investigate the significance
of these different drivers through several surveys: for example, in 2014 TINYpulse
published a survey about employees’ engagement and organizational culture, and
it collected over 200.000 anonymous responses from more than 500 organizations.
Among several questions, employees were asked "What motivates you to excel and
go the extra mile at your organization?", and the answers were far from expected (at
least, from a classic agency theory point of view): indeed, monetary compensation
resulted to be less powerful than other motivations, such as peer motivation, the
intrinsic desire to do a good job, recognition and encouragement, the possibility to
have a real impact or to meet clients’ needs, the possibility to grow professionally.
The relevance of such a plethora of drivers suggests the need to incorporate some
psychological elements into the analysis of employees motivation.
Behavioral economics relaxes some of the hypotheses of the standard agency the-
ory to incorporate the above-mentioned psychological elements, and experimental
economics provides much evidence to support the multifaceted motivational forces
of employees’ behavior: for example, it suggests that subjects can be influenced also
by their social preferences (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr et al., 1993; 1997; Fehr and Falk,
2007; Della Vigna et al., 2016), the relation and the comparison with peers (Char-
ness and Khun, 2007; Gächter et al., 2012; Nosenzo, 2013; Charness et al., 2016),
the enjoyment/interest in the task (Deci, 1971; Frey, 1997; Gagnè and Deci, 2005;
Deci et al., 2017), and so on.
The goal of this research is to explore two motivational forces that are different
from pure monetary rewards, but that are likely to drive employees’ behavior as
well: intrinsic motivation and solidarity. Intrinsic motivation arises when subjects
perceive an activity as enjoyable/interesting, and they approach it "as an end in
itself" (Kruglanski, 1975); it represents an internal driver of human behavior that
has been widely studied because of its power in producing several positive outcomes
(in terms of performance, engagement, satisfaction, and so on), but whose interac-
tions with other motivational forces are far from straightforward. Solidarity instead
2
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is usually defined as "a willingness to help people in need who are similar to one-
self but victims of outside influences" (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998: 518): despite it
represents a less explored topic (at least in a workplace context), we argue that it
should not be underestimated when subjects’ behavior is studied in relation to their
peers.
This doctoral dissertation is composed by three chapters, and its aim is to illus-
trate, both theoretically and experimentally, the effects of these motivational forces
on employees’ behavior. Chapter 1 is a review of the effects of the interaction be-
tween intrinsic motivation and other sources of motivation, both external (such as
outside interventions, social context and externally set goals) and internal (such
as subjects’ identity and personal goals). Firstly we explore the complex relation
between intrinsic motivation and external interventions, by spotlighting the differ-
ence in methodologies between the psychological and the economic approach, and
we evidence some studies attempting to fill the gap between these two strands of
research. Then we investigate how subjects’ social context can interact with both
intrinsic motivation and external rewards in at least three ways: 1) external rewards
are likely to affect both subjects’ intrinsic motivation and their personal/social im-
age 2) intrinsic motivation is crowded out by those interventions that are perceived
as a signal of distrust 3) some interventions are likely to shift subjects’ decision
frame from a social one to a monetary one. The third motivational driver that we
analyze is subjects’ identity, which is suggested to be generally positively linked to
intrinsic motivation. Finally, we explore the relation between intrinsic motivation
and different achievement goals (either mastery, performance approach, or perfor-
mance avoidance) and we illustrate our perplexities about a straight link between
goal setting and intrinsic motivation.
Chapter 2 is an experimental investigation of the relation between wage delega-
tion, intrinsic motivation and performance. A stream of experimental papers has
proved that, when people are delegated the choice of their own wage or payment
structure, they tend to perform better; however, there is still no consensus on the
psychological determinants of this effect (Charness et al., 2012; Mellizo et al., 2014;
Jeworrek and Mertins, 2015). We suggest that delegated people tend to exert higher
effort because the possibility to choose their own wage increases their intrinsic mo-
tivation; furthermore, we investigate whether differently motivated people react in
different ways to wage delegation. We propose a novel experimental design with
a creative task, in which each session is divided in two phases: in the first phase
3
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the payment is flat, while in the second phase it depends on the treatment. In
the delegation treatment the choice of the wage is delegated to the subjects, in the
control treatment subjects are given a random wage in such a way that the wage
distributions of the two treatments are equal. Between phase 1 and phase 2 we
introduce a free-choice phase, that is a phase in which subjects are told to do what-
ever they want and they are not paid: the effort exerted during the free-choice phase
represents our first measure of intrinsic motivation, while the self-assessed interest
in the task (rated after its completion) is our second measure. Our findings confirm
that when subjects are given the possibility to select their own wage, they tend to
perform better; furthermore, we find that those subjects who are both highly moti-
vated and delegated their wage choice are those who perform better. Nevertheless,
the ex-post measure of intrinsic motivation does not seem to be much influenced
by the compensation method: we propose two possible reasons for this result, one
methodological and one theoretical, that open the way to other possible investiga-
tions.
Chapter 3 illustrates a laboratory experiment in which we reproduce the cash
posters framework à la Homans (1953, 1954) with two main goals: 1) investigating
reciprocity within the employer-employee relation, both in terms of wage-effort and
in terms of effort-potential leniency 2) exploring whether employees’ behavior can
be moved also by solidarity concerns towards their peers in need. Our experiment is
a gift-exchange with punishment, real effort, and multiple workers: each employer
is matched with two employees and she has the possibility to punish each of them
if their individual production is lower than that asked. Each employee is asked to
exert a real effort, and his production risks to be reduced by a random device with
a known probability; in our treatment, each employee has the possibility to help the
coworker by renouncing to a part of his production and by giving it to him in order
to prevent the coworker from being punished. Our results support the widely proven
relation between proposed wage and exerted effort, but not the relation between ef-
fort and potential leniency in punishment: indeed, employers do not seem to be
willing to forgive employees’ noncompliance, neither when employees exerted high
effort in the past, nor when their coworkers exert high effort. Furthermore, when
employees are given the possibility to show their solidarity with their coworkers in
need, they do not only exploit this possibility, but they are even willing to exert
higher effort towards their employers. As a consequence, employers are the main
beneficiaries of employees’ solidarity, and in our treatment the difference in earnings
between employers and employees becomes even greater.
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This doctoral dissertation attempts to depict some aspects of the multifaceted
drivers of human behavior within a workplace context; despite it relies mainly on
laboratory evidence, my hope is that it will provide some hints to capture employees’
motivations all around, and consequently to help in building a comprehensive total
reward strategy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AT WORK:
A REVIEW
Intrinsic motivation has been widely recognized as a powerful driver of human
behavior, and it has been related to several positive outcomes (Gagnè and Deci,
2005; Ryan and Deci, 2008; Deci et al., 2017). However, most human activities are
not merely driven by the interest/enjoyment in the activity itself, but rather they
are motivated also by other forces. The aim of this review is to explore the effects of
the interaction between intrinsic motivation and other motivational drivers, related
to: a) external interventions (such as monetary compensation, controlling devices,
and so on), analyzed both from a psychological and an economic perspective, with
a focus on the strengths and the weaknesses of these approaches b) social context,
such as reputational concerns, perceptions of distrust, and the subject’s decision
frame (either social or monetary) c) subjects’ identity d) goals, explored both as
personal and externally set.
Keywords: Intrinsic motivation, Employee motivation, Rewards.
JEL Classification: J32; J33; M52; M54
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1.1 Introduction
Intrinsic motivation has been defined as that force that lead a subject to perform
an activity that is approached "as an end in itself" (Kruglanski, 1975), because the
subject "receives no apparent reward except the activity itself" (Deci, 1971: 105).
Most human activities (such as working, following social norms, upholding the law,
and so on) are not, or not only, intrinsically motivating; in these contexts, in order
to induce the subject to engage in the desired behavior, it is necessary to intro-
duce some external behavioral regulations that make the completion of the activity
instrumental to obtaining something else from the mere enjoyment of the activity
(Ryan, 1995). When the activity is perceived only "as a means to obtaining some-
thing else" (Kruglanski, 1975), the subject is said to be extrinsically motivated.
The self-determination theory (SDT) proposed by Deci and colleagues (Deci and
Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Gagnè and Deci, 2005; Deci et al., 2017) articu-
lates this basic distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and suggests
a continuum of motivation according to the degree to which the subject perceives
to be autonomous in determining his own behavior (Gagnè and Deci, 2005). On
the one extreme of this continuum there is a-motivation, that is a synonym of lack
of intention and motivation, and implies that the subject is essentially unaware of
the reason why he is performing an activity. Between a-motivation and intrinsic
motivation, there are four facets of extrinsic motivation that are divided according
to the degree to which the external intervention has been internalized. The least-
autonomous form of extrinsic motivation is external regulation: people perceive
their behavior to be out of their control and directly controlled by others (Deci et
al., 2017). Next to external regulation there is introjected regulation, which implies
that the regulation has been taken in by the person, but not yet accepted (Gangè
and Deci, 2005): subjects are pressured by their self-esteem or ego-involvement, and
their behaviors are aimed either at avoiding guilt and disapproval, or at achieving
pride and approval. More autonomous is perceived the behavior driven by identified
regulation: people perceive the rationale for acting as their own, and their behavior
becomes more congruent with their personal goals and identities. Finally, the most
autonomous form of extrinsic motivation is integrated regulation, and it represents
the full internalization of a regulation: the new regulation is now congruent with
the subject’s other values and needs.
The problem posited by SDT can be summarized in how to foster the inter-
7
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nalization and the integration of external regulations into one’s values and goals:
indeed, through these processes, the individual is able to move along the contin-
uum of motivation and to become more autonomously motivated to the point of
becoming intrinsically motivated. In order to fully internalize a regulation, SDT
proposes that three basic need should be fulfilled: the need for relatedness, the need
for competence, and, above all, the need for autonomy. The satisfaction of the ba-
sic needs and the consequent more autonomous (or intrinsic) motivation have been
proved to be related to several positive outcomes, such as high energy levels (Ryan
and Deci, 2008) and persistence (Deci, 1972; Vallerand and Blssonnette, 1992), en-
thusiasm and engagement (Rich, 2006), job satisfaction and commitment (Gagnè
et al., 2010), thriving (Spreitzer et al., 2005), creativity (Gagnè and Deci, 2005),
well-being (Nix et al., 1999), performance quality (Cerasoli et al., 2014; Kuvaas et
al., 2017), and so on (Gagnè and Deci, 2005; Ryan and Deci, 2008; Gagnè et al.,
2010; Cerasoli et al., 2014; Van de Broeck et al., 2016; Kuvaas et al., 2017).
Given the above-mentioned link between intrinsic motivation and several positive
outcomes, and considering that usually intrinsic motivation is not the only driver
of people’s behavior, the question arises of what happens when intrinsic motivation
interacts with other sources of motivation. The aim of this paper is indeed to dis-
cuss the effects of the interaction between intrinsic motivation and other sources of
motivation, both external and internal.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 illustrates what happens when
intrinsically motivated subjects are exposed to external interventions (monetary
compensation, controlling devices, and so on); this topic is analyzed separately for
psychological and for economic studies by underlying the differences in results and
methodologies, and by suggesting the strengths and weaknesses of the different ap-
proaches. The section concludes by presenting an overview of the studies attempting
to fill the gap between these two strands of research, and that focus on the inter-
action between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations into workplace contexts. Section
1.3 analyzes how the effects of the interaction between intrinsic motivation and ex-
ternal interventions are likely to depend also on subjects’ social interactions, at least
in three ways: first of all, external interventions are likely to affect simultaneously
people’s intrinsic motivation and their social/personal image; then, intrinsic moti-
vation tends to be undermined by those interventions that are perceived as signal
of distrust; finally, eternal interventions risk to shift the individual’s decision frame
from a social frame to a monetary frame, with a consequent decrease in intrinsic
8
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motivation. Section 1.4 suggests a positive link between intrinsic motivation and
subjects’ identity (or identification with the firm, the job, the task), and that they
can be both either undermined or enhanced by external interventions. Section 1.5
explores the relation between intrinsic motivation and different achievement goals
(mastery, performance approach, and performance avoidance), and between intrinsic
motivation and different levels of goal (general or task-specific); moreover, it illus-
trates our perplexities about a direct connection between goal setting and intrinsic
motivation. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Intrinsic motivation and external interventions
Subjects’ behavior is very often influenced not only by their intrinsic motiva-
tion, but also by the external motivation determined by the introduction of exter-
nal interventions, such as monetary compensation, control devices and surveillance,
feedbacks, and so on. Both economic and psychological studies have explored the
effects of the interaction between intrinsic motivation and external interventions,
and the next sub-sections will illustrate the different approaches in exploring the
consequences of this interaction.
1.2.1 Psychological studies
The seminal psychological paper presented by Deci (1971) is the first to suggest
that the introduction of a performance-contingent monetary reward can be detri-
mental for intrinsic motivation: his experiment was divided in three phases and in
each phase the subjects were offered the possibility either to solve some puzzles or
to read magazines. Neither in the first nor in the third phase the subjects were paid,
but in phase 2 subjects in the treatment condition were paid $1 when they solved
a puzzle, while subjects in the control group were not paid. During each phase
the experimenter left the room for few minutes saying the subjects to do whatever
they want during his absence (free-choice period): by comparing the changes in in-
trinsic motivation between phase 1 and phase 3, measured as the amount of time
that subjects spent in completing the task during the free-choice period, the results
indicated that the removal of the monetary reward crowded-out intrinsic motivation.
In the following decades, several psychological studies have expanded the find-
ings of Deci (1971) by focusing on how people’s behavior changes after the reward
9
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removal and measuring intrinsic motivation as a combination of free-choice behavior
and self-reported interest (rated through a questionnaire that subjects were asked to
complete after the task). Deci et al., (1999)’s meta-analysis reviewed and collected
evidence from more than 120 psychological studies: they showed that most tangi-
ble rewards significantly undermined the free-choice measure of intrinsic motivation,
except for tangible rewards that were connected to uninteresting activities, not con-
tingent on task behavior, or unexpected. Moreover, they suggested the undermining
effects of negative performance feedback and threats, deadlines, evaluations, direc-
tives, and surveillance; on the other hand, positive feedback, choice and opportunity
for self-direction, and acknowledgment of feelings were proved to enhance intrinsic
motivation.
These findings have been interpreted mainly in light either of the self-perception
theory (Bem 1972) or of the self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985).
The main assumption of the self-perception theory is that people are not perfectly
aware of the reason leading them to perform a task, either intrinsic or external (Fehr
and Falk, 2002). In order to understand it, they infer it from the circumstances in
which they are performing the task: therefore, when people are given a strong and
salient reward for performing an activity that they would do even in the absence of
this remuneration, the over-justification effect arises (Lepper et al., 1973). In ab-
sence of this reward, indeed, the completion of the task would have been attributed
to the intrinsic features of the task itself; however, when the specific external re-
ward is introduced, subjects reduce the motivation they can control for (intrinsic
motivation) because it has become unnecessary to be intrinsically motivated. As a
consequence, if the external reward is removed, the subjects end up with lower level
of intrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Festrè and Garrouste, 2015).
On the other hand, self-determination theory assumes that an external interven-
tion can either undermine or enhance subjects’ intrinsic motivation depending on its
ability in satisfying three basic psychological needs: the need for competence, the
need for autonomy, and the need for relatedness. The need for competence (White,
1959) is related to "the natural propensity to explore, to master the environment,
and to actively seek challenges that extend physical and psychological functioning"
(Vansteenkiste et al., 2008: 196); this need is satisfied when the subject perceives
self-efficacy in performing an activity. On the other hand, the need for autonomy
(de Charms, 1968) is satisfied when the subject feels an internal locus of causality,
meaning that he perceives himself as the origin of his own behavior (Ryan and Deci,
10
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2000; Gagnè and Deci, 2005; Dysvik et al., 2013; Vansteenkiste et al., 2008). Finally,
the need for relatedness is linked to the need for feeling respected and cared for by
the person’s social group (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Vansteenkiste
et al., 2008). According to the self-determination theory, as long as an external in-
tervention is able to satisfy these needs, it is likely to enhance intrinsic motivation;
otherwise, it will crowd-out intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Vansteenkiste
et al., 2008; Dysvik et al., 2013; Festrè and Garrouste, 2015).
As we have already mentioned, most psychological studies have measured the
change in intrinsic motivation as the difference between the amount of time that
subjects spend on completing the task during the free-choice period before the ex-
ternal intervention, and the amount of time spent in completing the task during the
free-choice period after the intervention. This measure has been largely criticized,
mainly because the change in behavior can be attributed to several causes, inde-
pendent from intrinsic motivation (Fehr and Falk, 2002): first of all, since during
the intervention provision subjects tend to exert higher effort, a decrease in effort
after the intervention can be due to a satiation effect (Dickinson, 1989); secondly,
if subjects receive a reward for performing a task and after a while the reward is
withdrawn, they are likely to exert lower effort because they are disappointed by
the reward removal; finally, subjects can interpret the reward as a signal that the
experimenter see the task as barely interesting, and it can induce them to perceive
the task as less motivating (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; 2006).
Another feature that is common to most psychological studies is the attention
in using interesting tasks in order to generate and to capture intrinsic motivation,
such as puzzle solving (Deci, 1971; Calder and Staw, 1975; Zuckerman et al., 1978),
drawing pictures (Lepper at el, 1973), finding hidden figures (Harackievicz, 1979;
Elliot et al., 2000), building constructions with blocks (Fabes et al., 1988), play-
ing computer games (Hitt et al., 1992), and so on. The reason for this choice is
that intrinsic motivation is said to raise only for those activities that are initially
interesting for the subject, therefore it is not possible to explore crowding-in or
crowding-out effects for dull tasks (Calder and Staw, 1975; Deci et al., 1999; Ryan
and Deci, 2000; Deci et al., 2001; Dessi and Rustichini, 2015; Festrè and Garrouste,
2015). This design choice is surely methodologically convincing, however at least
two perplexities arise. First of all, the initial interest in the task is often hypothe-
sized and only superficially examined (Hidi and Harackiewicz, 2000): for example,
some papers included in Deci et al. (1999)’s meta-analysis presented their tasks as
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interesting without checking for the effective initial interest (e.g. Deci, 1971; Zuck-
erman et al., 1978), or measuring only the relative interest in the task with respect
to another one (McLoyd, 1979). Secondly, in a design with such interesting and
enjoyable tasks, payments and rewards are likely to be situationally inappropriate
and maybe unexpected; therefore, it risks to be far from representing a situation in
which, for example, an employee expects to be paid for providing some effort (Fehr
and Falk, 2002).
1.2.2 Economic studies
Economists attention was firstly raised towards crowding-out effects by Titmuss
(1970), who suggested that, when people receive money for donating blood, they are
less likely to engage in this behavior. After this glimmer on the undermining effect of
external rewards, a strand of economic studies has developed on the circumstances
in which this effect does arise with the main focus on exploring, both theoretically
and experimentally, the crowding-out effects into a principal-agent setting. Frey
(1993; 1997) distinguished three situations that can derive from the impact of an
external intervention on people’s intrinsic motivation and behavior in a principal-
agent setting (Frey, 1997: 21):
1. According to the standard economic theory, external interventions such as
monetary compensation or fines produce the so-called relative price effect: that
is, they increase people’s performance because they increase the marginal cost
of shirking. The same result in terms of performance is obtained when the in-
troduction of an external device raises people’s intrinsic motivation (crowding-
in effect): the marginal benefit of performing is higher and the relative price
effect works in the same direction of the crowding effect.
2. On the other hand, external intervention can reduce people’s intrinsic motiva-
tion (crowding-out effect): as a consequence, the marginal benefit of perform-
ing decreases and the performance is lower.
3. Usually, both the price effect and the crowding-out effect influence people’s
behavior, and the strength of these effects determines whether the intervention
is beneficial for the performance or not.
An external intervention is said to crowd-out intrinsic motivation as long as it
is perceived controlling, because it is likely to mortify the person’s needs for self-
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Figure 1.1: Net outcome of the price effect and the crowding-out effect (Frey and
Jegen, 2001)
determination and for self-esteem1; on the other hand, when an external intervention
is perceived as supportive, or it is administered in an autonomy-supportive climate,
it will enhance intrinsic motivation (Gagné and Deci, 2005).
Figure 1 shows what happens when the relative-price effect and the crowding-out
effect interact (Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001). S represents the classical supply
curve when only the price effect is working: when an external reward is introduced
(from 0 to R), the effort supplied increases from A to A’. Instead, when the price
effect interacts with the crowding out effect, the supply curve shifts to S’ and the
work effort is lowered to A”. It is interesting to observe that, when the supply curve
is influenced both by the price effect and the crowding-out effect, in order to induce
the subject to exert the effort A’ it is necessary to provide an higher reward R’.
Starting from the 1990s, experimental economics has been largely focused on
exploring the crowding-out effect: differently form the psychological studies, here
the objective has been the analysis of the final result of the interaction between the
price-effect and the crowding-out effect during the intervention provision. Most eco-
nomic studies have explored the crowding-out effect of the introduction of control
and fines (Nagin et al., 2002; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and List, 2004; Falk and
Kosfeld, 2006; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2012) and different
compensation schemes (Frey and Götte, 1999; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Hossain
1The need for self-determination is somehow similar to the above-mentioned need for autonomy
and for feeling an internal locus of control; the need for self-esteem, instead, is related to the
person’s need for an acknowledgment of his competence and involvement in the activity
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and Li, 2014; Dessi and Rustichini, 2015; Goto et al., 2015), and their findings sup-
ported the connection between subjects’ perception of control and low motivation
and performance; moreover, they confirmed that, when subjects are motivated and
a payment is introduced, it is necessary to make this payment generous in order
to induce the subjects to increase their performance. For an exhaustive analysis of
the results, see section 1.3; for now, let us draw few general considerations on the
methodology and the findings of the economic studies.
First of all, it is necessary to underline that most economic studies do not pro-
vide much attention to the initial interest in the task, especially when the aim is
to find support to the hidden cost of control hypothesis: indeed, most experimental
designs are based on principal-agent settings with stated effort (Fehr and Gächter,
2002; Fehr and List, 2004; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2012) or,
when the effort is real, it does not seem much interesting, such as working in a call
center (Nagin et al., 2002), progressing along a curve in a laboratory game (Dick-
inson and Villeval, 2008), doing data entry (Hossain and Li, 2014), rice planting
(Goto et al., 2015), and so on.2 The reason for that is probably related to the fact
that the main aim of these studies is to explore the effect of fines and incentives
on subjects’ performance, not on subjects’ intrinsic motivation: indeed, subjects’
intrinsic motivation is usually not measured, neither with a behavioral measure nor
through a questionnaire. The change in motivation is suggested later as a possible
determinant of the performance decrease, together with other possible causes such
as distrust, negative reciprocity or a reaction to the signals that the principal sends
by using a specific kind of incentive (Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polanìa-Reyes,
2012; Festrè and Garrouste, 2015).
Secondly, not all the economic studies on the effects of incentives and fines on
people’s motivation and performance agree on considering crowding-out a relevant
topic: for example, Prendergast (1999) showed some skepticism about the relevance
of crowding-out effects for industrial organizations, mainly because the empirical
evidence about workplace settings was scarce and most psychological studies used
interesting tasks that risked to be far from the workplace ones (Festrè and Gar-
rouste, 2015); Fehr and Falk (2002), instead, were mainly concerned about the im-
2Despite most economic studies on intrinsic motivation are based on uninteresting tasks, there
are at least two noteworthy exceptions that address the relation between task meaning and re-
muneration: Ariely et al. (2008), who asked subjects to assembly Lego models; Chandler and
Kapelner (2012), who ran a natural field experiments where subjects were asked to label medical
images (we warm thank professor Pelligra for this remark).
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possibility of disentangling intrinsic motivation from signaling reactions, and from
disappointment effects. Other studies suggested that monetary compensation and
intrinsic motivation can be complementary in determining subjects’ performance
when the monetary incentives are either small (Dessi and Rustichini, 2015), indi-
rectly performance-salient (Cerasoli et al., 2014), or even performance-contingent
(Fang et al., 2013; Ledford, 2014). The debate on whether intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation are positively or negatively related is still ongoing, and some questions
remain open: How is it possible to relate laboratory findings to real-world sce-
narios? What is the interactive impact of incentives and intrinsic motivation on
performance? What is the role of psychological need satisfaction in determining
subjects’ performance? The next sub-session attempts to deal with these doubts by
presenting the latest developments.
1.2.3 Narrowing the gap and practical implications
In the last decade, few studies have attempted to bridge the gap between the
psychological and the economic approach, and they have been mainly focused on
developing a link between incentives, satisfaction of the three basic psychological
needs, and performance into workplace contexts. Gagnè and Forest (2008) hypoth-
esized that laboratory rewards affect subjects’ motivation differently from real-life
monetary incentives (Rynes et al., 2005), and they proposed an analysis of how
different components of compensation can influence the need for competence, for
autonomy, and for relatedness, and consequently intrinsic motivation. They sug-
gested that perceived competence should be positively influenced by the base-pay
level (Kuvaas, 2006) and the need for relatedness should be satisfied by profit shar-
ing, stock ownership, group incentives (as long as subjects’ do not feel peer pres-
sure and monitoring, Han and Shen, 2007); moreover, an overall needs satisfaction
should be obtained through skill-based pay plans, a perceived distributive fairness,
an organizational culture that supports cooperation, a supportive work climate, and
interesting and meaningful jobs. Furthermore, if the work climate is perceived as
supportive, also contingent reward can be perceived as satisfying the basic psycho-
logical needs, mainly because they can be seen as fair and consequently increase
subjects’ sense of competence.
The link between pay-per-performance and intrinsic motivation, however, is still
controversial. On the one hand, some authors suggested a positive link between pay-
per-performance, perceived autonomy and perceived competence (Fang and Gerhart,
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2012), mainly because employees have the possibility to materialize their compe-
tence in higher pay, and to perceive their behavior as the only origin of their pay
(Fang et al., 2013; Gerhart and Fang, 2015). On the other hand, Cerasoli and col-
leagues (2016) used a meta-analysis to explore the link between directly-salient and
indirectly-salient incentives, the satisfaction of the three basic psychological needs,
and performance: they found that those subjects who perceived their needs to be
satisfied tended to outperform others, and only those incentives that were indirectly
connected to performance tended to increase needs satisfaction. Because of the great
impact of the joint effect of indirectly-salient incentives and needs satisfaction on
performance, they proposed some intervention to bolster the psychological needs
such as encourage employees to set specific and attainable goals, and provide them
feedback and public recognition (need for competence); create a supportive envi-
ronment, for example using telework (need for autonomy); respect employees and
adhere to agreed-upon policies, make the employees feel trusted and treated fairly
(need for relatedness).
To these interventions, Gerhart and Fang (2015) added other factors to be in-
corporated in the management practices in order to facilitate the internalization of
external motivation, such as a careful use of external rewards in giving different
priorities to different goals, in order to avoid that the incentive becomes the major
driver of goal choice; a wise use of different compensation schemes in order to at-
tract different subjects: for example, high performers were said to prefer (and to be
more intrinsically motivated) when the pay-performance link is strong; the incor-
poration of equity considerations, both in terms of social comparisons and in terms
of link between performance and pay. Other interventions that are likely to fulfill
the psychological needs are said to be: allowing employees to have more autonomy
in their choices, and acknowledging their responsibilities and contributions (Lynch
et al., 2005; Stone et al., 2009); giving precise and sincere feedbacks that under-
line employees’ engagement and initiative (Stone et al., 2009); training employers
in the principles of the self-determination theory (Hardrè and Reeve, 2009; Deci et
al., 2017); providing a transformational leadership, that is leading through inspiring,
encouraging, stimulating, and empowering (Bass, 1985; Gözükara and Simsek, 2015;
Deci et al., 2017); rewarding employees with public awards (Frey and Neckermann,
2008).
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1.3 Social context
1.3.1 Reputational concerns
(...) consider the following scenario. An individual is considering buying
a new environmentally friendly hybrid car which is more expensive than
an equivalent car with a standard gasoline engine. Driving an automobile
that is clearly a hybrid car would probably add to one’s positive image(...).
Suppose the government introduces a well-publicized and large tax benefit
for those who purchase a hybrid car. On the one hand, the tax incentive
reduces the price of the hybrid car, making its purchase more attractive.
On the other hand, the tax incentive decreases the image value derived from
driving the hybrid. Without the tax incentive, buying a hybrid car definitely
shows the individual cares for the environment (positive image); with the
tax incentives, it does not (Ariely et al., 2009: 548).
Image motivation, or reputational concern, refers indeed to individuals’ tendency
to be partially motivated by how others perceive them; therefore, it is related to
the desire to be liked and respected by the others and by the self. If individuals are
looking for social approval in their behavior, then they should try to signal traits
which are defined as good based on social norms and values. Bénabou and Tirole
(2006) proposed a theoretical study that explores the interaction between intrinsic
motivation and image motivation: they demonstrated how extrinsic rewards can
undermine intrinsic motivation when people have reputational concerns, including
both social image and self-image concerns. Agents’ behavior reflects a mix of three
motivations (intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational) that has to be inferred from their
choices and the context. The authors suggested that extrinsic rewards can crowd-
out intrinsic motivation, mainly because of the over-justification effect: since people
take pro-social actions in part to signal one’s own identity to others (and/or to
themselves), the presence of even small extrinsic rewards can spoil the reputational
value of good deeds, creating doubts about the extent to which they are performed
for the incentives rather than for themselves. Moreover, since external incentives
are typically quite specific while the intrinsic features of the task are more uncer-
tain, pro-social behavior is more likely to be attributed (either by the others and by
the subject himself) to the external incentive rather than to the intrinsic motivation.
Bénabou and Tirole’s reputational model is supported by an extensive body of
experimental literature that has explored how people’s motivation is affected by
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receiving an external reward for behaviors that are usually made voluntarily; this
body of literature spreads over different fields, such as blood donation (Titmuss,
1970; Ireland and Koch, 1973; Wright, 2002; Mellström and Johannesson, 2008),
social norm adherence in everyday life (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000), volunteering
(Myers and Carpenter, 2007; Fiorillo, 2009), charity giving (Ariely et al., 2009) and
so on. We have already mentioned the seminal book by Titmuss (1970), which ar-
gued that monetary compensation for donating blood might reduce the quantity of
the blood donated and would be economically inefficient: indeed, the introduction
of an external reward may decrease the opportunity for the donor to signal (to the
others, but also to himself) his altruistic intentions and his intrinsic motivation.
Following in Titmuss’ footsteps, maybe the most widely-cited study is the field ex-
periment ran by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000): they introduced a monetary fine for
those parents who arrived late to collect their children from a daycare center, and
reported a significant increase in the number of parents coming late after the intro-
duction of this penalty. The interpretation of this evidence in light of the Bènabou
and Tirole’s model suggests that before the introduction of the monetary penalty,
parents were likely to be motivated also by concerns for daycare center workers (or
for other parents) and by a desire to signal that they are responsible and sincerely
concerned for others (Rebitzer and Tayler, 2011). The imposition of a monetary
penalty diluted this signal, and therefore reduced the strength of these motivating
forces. Finally, in Ariely et al. (2009)’s experiment, subjects could donate to a
charitable organization by clicking two keys on the keyboard either in a public or
in a private setting, and were randomly assigned to receive (in addition to the do-
nation made on their behalf) monetary incentives. The results show that monetary
incentives are less effective in inducing public pro-social activity: that is, with ex-
trinsic incentives the signal of a pro-social act is diluted, the image value decreases,
and consequently the incentive becomes less effective. If the pro-social decision is
private, there is no signal to send to other players, and extrinsic incentives are very
likely to increase pro-social behavior.
1.3.2 To trust or not to trust?
According to the standard agency theory, the disciplining effect of monitoring
should lead to an increase of performance: since the principal-agent relation is char-
acterized by a conflict of interest between the parties and the effort is costly for the
self-interested agent, the principal should use control devices to dissuade the agent
from the most opportunistic actions. After the introduction of monitoring and/or
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fines, the agent is likely to work harder to reduce the probability of a sanction (Pren-
dergast, 1999).
What if, besides the explicit contract between the parties, there is also an im-
plicit psychological contract that makes the relation less impersonal? Agents are
likely to become frustrated when they perceive the controlling devices introduced
by principals as signals of distrust. As a consequence, this perceived distrust might
reduce agents’ intrinsic motivation and the marginal benefit they get from work
effort; consequently, the introduction of a controlling device might encourage oppor-
tunistic behavior. This mechanism can be connected to the social exchange theory
(Homans, 1958; Blau, 1964) that posits the existence of a system of exchange of
gifts between principals and agents: principals "give" trust, loyalty and recognition
to workers, and workers "give" effort in return. In this context, monitoring signals a
breach of trust to which workers respond by breaking their part of social exchange
contract and by lowering their effort level. Frey (1993) proposed a theoretical frame-
work that accounts also for the negative effects of monitoring on agents’ effort (Falk
and Kosfeld, 2006). He identified the conditions in which the crowding-out effect of
monitoring is more likely to prevail over the disciplining effect, and the conditions
in which the relation is reversed: by presenting some experimental and econometric
evidences, he concluded that the more interpersonal is the principal-agent relation-
ship, the more likely it is that monitoring backfires on the principal and actually
reduces agent’s effort (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008).
The crowding out of agents’ intrinsic motivation due to a perceived distrust, and
consequently the reduction of their effort, is a very well supported phenomenon. For
example, a stream of experimental literature has broadly documented the undermin-
ing effects of the controlling devices that are likely to send a weak signal of distrust,
such as monitoring and surveillance systems (Lepper and Greene, 1975; Pittman
et al., 1980; Plant and Ryan, 1985; Enzle and Anderson, 1993; Griffith, 1993; Na-
gin et al., 2002; Schulze and Frank, 2003; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Dickinson and
Villeval, 2008; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2012): Lepper and Greene (1975) compared the
performances of some children who were told that they would be monitored via a
television camera with that of children in the non-surveillance condition, and they
showed that monitored children were less intrinsically motivated. Using a simple
data entry task, Griffith (1993) found that performance was lower with physical
monitoring than with no monitoring, except when there was an active supervisor.
Dickinson and Villeval (2008) showed that monitoring was more likely to under-
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mine intrinsic motivation when the monitoring intensity exceeded its equilibrium
level and when the employment relationship was based on interpersonal links, as in
the model proposed by Frey (1993). Falk and Kosfeld (2006) used a modified gift-
exchange game to suggest that a reduction in motivation can be caused not only
by the introduction of monitoring and controlling devices, but also by the require-
ment of minimum performance. Their results have been confirmed and extended by
Ziegelmeyer et al. (2012), though in their study the hidden costs of control were not
always significant enough to reduce the effectiveness of economic incentives.
1.3.3 Social frame and monetary frame
In all the situations mentioned in this section, people’s behavior follows some
social norms whose prescriptions are independent of any external rewards. Donat-
ing blood, charity giving, and volunteering may be considered as moral duties to
the community that one should perform as often as possible. Showing trustworthi-
ness to trusting people may be seen as aimed at reciprocating the counterpart in
return for a previously obtained benefit. We have already seen how image concerns
and the destruction of a trust climate can lead the individual to loose his intrinsic
motivation and to perform poorly, but this is not the whole story. Several authors
suggested that the introduction of extrinsic rewards might not only reduce the in-
dividual’s intrinsic motivation, but even shift the individuals’ decision frame from
a social frame to a monetary one (Clark and Mills, 1979; Fiske, 1992; Kreps, 1997;
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Gneezy, 2003; Heyman and
Ariely 2004; Bowles, 2008; Hossain and Li, 2014; Dessi and Rustichini, 2015; Goto
et al., 2015). In a communal (or social) relationships, "the giving of a benefit in
response to the recipient’s need for the benefit is appropriate, while in an exchange
relationships is more appropriate for individuals to give a benefit only in response to
the receipt of another benefit" (Clarks and Mills, 1979: 12). Given this context, the
introduction of a monetary reward may lead to a shift from the desire of following
the social norms -which are likely to rule the communal relationship- to maximizing
profits (Kreps, 1997). More precisely, Heyman and Ariely (2004), looking at Fiske’s
relational theory (1992), stated and proved that the relation between payment and
effort depends on the type of exchange between the counterpart: in social-market
relations, the amount of compensation is irrelevant and individuals work as hard as
they can regardless of payment (Trivers, 1971; Batson et al., 1997; Cialdini, 1997);
in money-market relationships, the individual’s level of effort is directly influenced
by the amount of compensation he received, and his aim becomes the maximization
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his payoff (Clark and Mills, 1993; Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Falk, 2002).
Several experimental papers have explored the consequences of a shift from a
social frame to a market frame, but the results are not so straightforward as the
theory could suggest. On one hand, Goto et al. (2015) investigated the interplay
between economic incentives and social norms in formulating rice planting contracts
in Philippines: by comparing the effectiveness of fixed wages with that of individual
or group piece rate, they found that under fixed wage, altruistic people with guilt-
averse or non-envious preferences exerted more effort. However, the important role
played by social preferences in the fixed wage treatment disappeared once the mon-
etary incentives of the individual piece rate contract were introduced, and subjects’
intrinsic motivation was crowded-out. Dessi and Rustichini (2015) compared two
experiments in which the subjects were asked to solve an IQ quiz either in a "race
against themselves" or as a work for an artificial employer, with different compensa-
tion schemes (fixed wage, low or high piece rate). Their results supported perfectly
the theory proposed by Heyman and Ariely (2004): in the "race against themselves"
treatment there were no significant differences in performance across treatments,
while in the market-frame the piece rate had an highly significant positive effect on
performance.
On the other hand, in Hossain and Li (2014)’s field experiment, the experimental
subjects were given the possibility to spend voluntarily some time in entering data
in a software, either as a favor to an employer (social frame) or as simple work (work
frame), and with four possible wage rates (free, low, medium, high) for each line of
additional data entry. They observed that, in the social frame, the rate of partic-
ipation in the voluntary task dropped down from free to low wage rates, and then
it increased significantly for medium and high wages; conversely, under the work
frame, there were no differences between treatments. However, for what regards the
number of lines written, there was not a framing effect and a positive wage rate
significantly increased the data entered under both frames; therefore, crowding out
occurred only when social preference was explicitly induced.
Moreover, there is an extensive stream of research showing that when people are
intrinsically motivated, the introduction of external rewards leads to a decrease in
productivity only for small incentives; on the contrary, when the incentives are large
enough, the productivity increases (Frey and Götte, 1999; Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000; Gneezy, 2003; Pouliakas, 2010). This result is perfectly in line with Figure
1.1.
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For example, Frey and Götte (1999) used a unique data set from Switzerland to
explore the effects of financial rewards on the effort put into volunteer work; they
found that, when volunteers received a small monetary reward, they worked less
than non-paid volunteers; on the other hand, those volunteers who were given an
higher remuneration, tended to work for more hours. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
compared students’ performance on a quiz under different compensation schemes:
a fixed participation fee, a low piece rate and an high piece rate. The results re-
vealed that the average performance was higher in the fixed fee treatment than in
the low piece rate treatment, but the highest average performance was found with
a higher piece rate. That is, when students were completing the task without be-
ing rewarded according to their performance, performing well was a sort of race
against themselves, and therefore subjects were intrinsically motivated. When a
piece rate was introduced, students’ intrinsic motivation dropped, and their aim be-
came the maximization of their payoff. Therefore, if the piece rate was large enough
to compensate their effort in performing the quiz, their performance increased; if
not, students did not find any reason to work hard and their performance decreased.
The same authors (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000) found similar results analyzing the
efforts of teenage volunteers in collecting charitable donations: when they were given
a small percentage of the charitable donations, they collected less money than those
who volunteered for free; and those who received higher percentages performed as
well as the volunteers who did not receive any payment. Few years later, Gneezy
(2003) named this pattern as the W effect and corroborated the previously obtained
results: using a proposer-responder game in which the responder had the possibility
to punish or reward the proposer in different ways (depending on the treatment), he
found that when proposers were allowed to dictate the allocation, they gave more
money than in the treatments with either a small reward or a small fine. On the
other hand, when the fine or the reward was large enough, proposers were more
generous.
1.4 Identity
Several experiments in social psychology, and increasingly in economics, have
shown that people’s behavior is influenced by who individuals think they are (Sherif
et al., 1954; Tajfel et al., 1971; McLeish and Oxoby, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009) and
by which social category they think to belong to (Shih et al., 1999; Hoff and Pandey,
2006). Moreover, it has been well established that people tend to behave more fa-
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vorably towards those who belong to their own group, and that group identity is
somehow easy to manipulate (Tajfel et al., 1971; Götte et al., 2006; Chen and Li,
2009); finally, it is needless to underline the before mentioned connection between
intrinsic motivation and need for relatedness, that is depicted as "a need for a sense
of belongingness and connectedness to the persons, group, or culture disseminating
a goal" (Ryan and Deci, 2000: 64) and can be easily linked to the idea of group iden-
tity. These findings are likely to suggest to incorporate identity into the economics
of organization and work incentives, and to consider the change in identity as a way
to motivate employees, complement (or substitute) to monetary incentives.
Some theoretical studies argued that workers’ intrinsic motivation is strongly
linked to the way in which they see themselves in relation to the firm (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2000, 2005, 2008; Berdud and Cabasés, 2012; Polidori and Teobaldelli,
2017). Workers’ identification with their positions, jobs, tasks, etc. is likely to
lead to higher performance in the organization, due to the higher productivity of
those motivated and identified workers (Berdud et al., 2016). According to Akerlof
and Kranton (2000, 2005), identity can be an important supplement to monetary
compensation, which as sole motivator is likely to be both costly and ineffective.
They suggested that workers’ utility function can change as people take on differ-
ent possible identities, and they proposed an illustrative model of work incentives
and organizations. Workers are classified into two social categories: the insiders
(N), those who identify with the firm, and the outsiders (O), those who lack this
identification. The overall utility of the worker can be written as
U(y, e; c) = ln y − e+ Ic − tc|e∗(c)− e|
where U is the worker’s utility, y is his income, e is his actual effort, c is his social
category (outsider, insider), Ic is his identity utility from being in category c, and
tc|e∗(c)− e| is the dis-utility from diverging from the ideal effort level for category c.
According to this utility function, worker’s decisions are influenced by his social cat-
egory and her norms, and his utility decreases when the effort he exerts differs from
the effort he thinks it is appropriate for his social category 3: moreover, workers who
belong to different categories should be remunerated with different wages in order
to induce them to exert the same level of effort. For these reasons, a firm might be
willing to invest to change a worker’s identity from an outsider to an insider, in order
3In Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 2005)’s studies, norms refer to the way in which people think
that they and others should behave, and they vary with their social category
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to rely on identity-based incentives instead of (or complements to) extrinsic rewards.
Few years later, the authors extended their own model by examining the relation
between work-group identity, incentives and supervisory policies (Akerlof and Kran-
ton, 2008): workers could identify themselves as outsiders or members of a work-
group, and a supervisor has the possibility to observe workers’ actions either with
strict or loose supervision. The authors showed a trade-off between these regimes:
with strict supervision, the information about workers’ efforts are surely more com-
plete, but since workers are likely to suffer from being monitored (see subsection
1.3.2) they are less likely to identify with the firm and its goals. Consequently, the
workers are led to consider the supervisor as part of management, to became out-
siders and eventually to require higher pay to perform. On the other hand, under
a loose supervision regime, less information about workers’ effort are gathered, but
workers are more likely to view the supervisor as part of the work-group, to identify
themselves with the work-group, to be more motivated and consequentially to exert
higher effort at the same pay level. The authors concluded that sometimes it could
be more useful, for a firm, to choose a loose supervision regime, in order to induce
workers to identify with the work-group.
The model proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 2008) was extended by
Berdud and Cabasés (2012), who used a principal-agent game in which doctors
(agents) are intrinsically motivated and can have different identities, and their in-
trinsic motivation and identity can be undermined or enhanced by the contract
proposed by their health managers (principals).
Related to the concept of intrinsic motivation, the authors introduced the concept
of mission, "as the way in which doctors would like to perform in their profession:
they have preferences to be empathetic with patients, to do extra work when this
is required for the wellness of patients, and so on "(Berdud and Cabasés, 2012: 7).
The authors showed that, in presence of identity concerns and intrinsic motivation,
the sole use of monetary incentive is likely to cause crowding out of doctors’ in-
trinsic motivation and a loss in their identity: moreover, they argued that when a
doctor develops a sense of identification in organization, he becomes more willing to
work for lower monetary incentives. As a consequence, the authors suggested that
it could be useful for organizations to invest in supporting doctors’ mission, in order
to encourage their identity, and crowd-in their intrinsic motivation.
Polidori and Teobaldelli (2017) applied the model presented by Akerlof and Kranton
(2005) to the public sector, and they allowed agents to be intrinsically motivated
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and to behave in conformity to their perceived social category and self-image. The
agent’s effort is private information and, depending on the monitoring technology,
it may be detected by the principal. They proved that when agents are guided by
intrinsic motivations, it might be optimal for the principal to choose a relatively
inefficient monitoring technology and to reduce monetary incentives.
The above mentioned theoretical interaction between identity, intrinsic moti-
vation and monitoring has been investigated also in a laboratory setting by one
experimental paper (Riener and Wiederhold, 2016). They used a principal-agent
game, in which each principal-agent couple could either be exposed to a team build-
ing activity, or not. After the activity, the agent was asked to exert an effort on
behalf of the principal, and the principal was allowed to restrict the agent’s effort
choice by introducing a minimum effort. Finally, the agent performed a real-effort
task and decided how to share his remuneration with the principal. They found that
these two mechanisms (the team-building activity and the control device), taken per
se, were able to increase agents’ effort; nevertheless, when agents were exposed to
the activity finalized to develop a team identity, they tended to respond more neg-
atively to control devices. They concluded that the simultaneous introduction of
control devices and team-building activities is not advisable. This result confirms
the field evidence reported by Barkema (1995), who proposed a study in a series
of Dutch firms and found that when managers are controlled by an in-house CEO,
they decrease the number of working hours.
1.5 Goals
1.5.1 Goal achievement theory
It has been widely suggested that there is a link between the reason that lead a
person to engage in an achievement activity and his intrinsic motivation in complet-
ing that activity (Ames, 1992; Heyman and Dweck, 1992; Elliot and Harackiewicz,
1996; Lee et al., 2003; Gómez-Miñambres, 2012; Corgnet et al., 2015). According
to many early achievement goal theorists, two distinct forms of achievement goals
are delineated (Dweck, 1986; Ames, 1984; Dweck and Leggett, 1988; Nicholls, 1989;
Molden and Dweck, 2000): mastery goals (also called learning, intrinsic, or task
goals) and performance goals (ego, extrinsic, or ability goals). Mastery goals are re-
lated to subjects’ desire to achieve a sense of competence and mastery based on self-
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referenced standard; mastery oriented people believe that they will obtain this sense
of mastership by exerting a profound effort in performing the task. For this reason,
mastery goals are said to encourage task involvement, support self-determination
and finally generate intrinsic motivation in performing the task (Ames, 1992; Elliot
and Harackiewicz, 1996; Locke and Latham, 2006). On the other hand, performance
goals are linked to subjects’ desire to prove their competence and to outperform oth-
ers; therefore the completion of the task is not seen as enjoying or involving in itself,
but only as functional to the achievement of success with respect to the others
(Ames, 1992; Rawsthorne and Elliot, 1999; Barron and Harackiewicz, 2001; Molden
and Dweck, 2000). As a consequence, performance goals are perceived as generating
lower levels of intrinsic motivation (Ames and Archer, 1988; Deci and Ryan, 1990;
Ryan et al., 1991).
In the early nineties, Elliot (1994) conduced a meta-analysis on the literature
linking intrinsic motivation and achievement goal dichotomy, and he found that
the binomials mastery goal–crowding in and performance goal–crowding out were
shown in less than 50% of the studies: the reason was that the mastery/performance
partition did not take into account that people with performance goals could desire
either to demonstrate their competence or to avoid a demonstration of incompetence.
In an attempt of discerning these two motives, Elliot and Harackiewicz (1996) pro-
posed a trichotomous achievement goal model of mastery, performance-approach and
performance-avoidance goals: performance approach–goals are related to the aim of
obtaining favorable judgments of competence and outperforming others, while per-
formance avoidance–goals are aimed at avoiding failure or negative judgments. The
authors suggested that both performance-approach and mastery goals are related
to attaining competence, and these approach orientations usually lead to processes
that facilitate optimal task engagement and foster intrinsic motivation; on the other
hand, the avoidance orientation seems to be linked to processes that are antithetical
to the intrinsic motivation construct. In order to prove that, they ran two laboratory
experiments about puzzle solving in which participants could have either a negative
or positive outcome focus, and the target task was diagnostic of either failure or suc-
cess. Their findings supported the hypothesis that only those situations framed to
generate performance-avoidance goals lead to a crowding-out of intrinsic motivation.
Starting from this general background, the link between achievement goal theo-
ries and intrinsic motivation has been expanded in several ways. For example, Dweck
and colleagues (Müller and Dweck, 1998; Molden and Dweck, 2000) analyzed how
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people motivation is influenced by the meaning that they give to an achievement
situation. They argued that when people perceive a task as measuring one fixed
attribute of the self (such as fixed intelligence), they tend to reduce their level of
intrinsic motivation after a failure; on the other hand, when people believe that
succeeding in performing a task depends on their effort or on a current level of an
acquirable ability, their intrinsic motivation is not influenced by their success or
failure. The authors supported their hypothesis simply by praising some students
with different feedbacks (either for their ability or for their intelligence) for two se-
quential tasks of increasing difficulty: they found clear decrease in performance and
in intrinsic motivation in the second task (the most difficult) for those subjects who
received intelligence feedback.
Another stream of research has investigated how different levels of goals, either
general or task-specific, influence subjects’ intrinsic motivation (Harackiewicz and
Sansone, 1991; Harackiewicz and Elliot, 1998; Barron and Harackiewicz, 2000; Durik
and Harackiewicz, 2003). The higher level goal, or purpose, represents the reason
for engaging in a task or what subjects hope to achieve by performing the task;
task specific goals, or targets, are more concrete and provide specific behavioral
guidelines. According to the model proposed by Harackiewicz and Sansone (1991),
intrinsic motivation is maximized when both the purpose and the target goals are
oriented towards the same objective (either mastery or performance), and target
goals make the obtainment of purpose goals easier (Harackiewicz and Elliot, 1998:
676). Moreover, they identified three processes through which purposes and targets
could influence subjects’ intrinsic motivation: perceived competence, that has al-
ready identified as a mediator of interest (Bandura and Schunk, 1981); competence
valuation, that is people’s evaluation about their performance in the activity; and
task involvement, meaning the degree to which people become absorbed in the ac-
tivity (Harackiewicz and Sansone, 1991; Harackiewicz and Elliot, 1998; Barron and
Harackiewicz, 2000).
Our little excursus shows a multifaceted picture of the relation between intrinsic
motivation and goal achievement. Indeed, people’s intrinsic motivation results to be
influenced not only by the reason that lead them to engage in a particular activity,
could be either learning, outperforming others, or avoiding failure; but it is also
affected by people’s perception of the meaning of an achievement situation, and by
the coherence of hierarchical goals. And the situation becomes even more tangled if
we consider also the motivational power of goal setting.
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1.5.2 Goal setting
According to the goal setting theory, hard and specific goals lead to a higher
level of task performance than do easy or vague goals such as the exhortation to
"do your best" (Locke and Latham, 1990, 2002, 2006; Locke, 1996): as long as a
person is committed to the goal, has sufficient ability to attain it, and does not have
conflicting goals, goal difficulty is positively linked to task performance (Locke and
Latham, 2006).
Nevertheless, it is not straightforward to determine the effect of the introduction
of a specific goal on people intrinsic motivation: goals are said to be motivational
(Locke and Latham, 2002; 2006; 2013), but the motivation that these authors are re-
ferring to is different from intrinsic motivation as we have depicted it. Indeed, their
concept of motivation can be related to the intrinsic task motivation à la Thomas
and Velthouse (1990), in which the term task is referred to a set of activities di-
rected toward a purpose, therefore it includes both activities and a purpose; on the
other hand, the Deci and colleagues’ model of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971; Deci
and Ryan, 1985) refers only to activities, and therefore it is focused mainly on the
interest in performing an activity. According to the goal setting theory, the intro-
duction of a goal creates a psychological discrepancy between one’s current position
and one’s desired position (that is, the attainment of the goal): it is indeed the exis-
tence of this discrepancy that motivates people to work hard to fill it (Schröder and
Fishbach, 2015; Locke and Latham, 2006). Furthermore, goals provide workers with
reference points for their utility and satisfaction, and for their performance (Heath
et al., 1999; Locke and Latham, 2002; Koch and Nafziger, 2011; Goerg, 2015): with
regards to this reference point, workers can measure their gains and losses, and their
loss aversion motivates them to work hard to avoid falling short of the goal.
As we can see, what drives people’s behavior is not the interest or enjoyment in the
activity, but their desire to fill the above–mentioned psychological discrepancy or to
avoid being dissatisfied: consequently, the task is not perceived as an end in itself
but rather as a mean to an end.
There are four processes through which goal setting is said to influence people’s
motivation and performance (Locke and Latham, 2002; Latham, 2004): the first
two mechanisms are related to the power of goals to direct people’s actions towards
goal–related activities, and to increase people’s effort in an attempt to reach the tar-
gets. As we have already mentioned, the idea of behaving with the aim of reaching
a target, and focusing only on the activities finalized at its obtainment, is different
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from the concept of intrinsic motivation.
Third, goals lead people to be more persistent in performing the activity, and it can
be easily related to their desire of avoiding the dissatisfaction generated by a failure
in reaching the goal. It is worthwhile to underline the difference between this kind
of persistence, and the persistence of those people who are intrinsically motivated
in performing the task: indeed, in the last case people keep on completing the task
simply for the sake of performing it. The final mechanism refers to how goals mo-
tivate people to use their existing ability, or to search for new knowledge, in order
to attain them. This process can effectively increase subjects’ intrinsic motivation
by increasing their perceived competence: both Csikszentmihalyi (1975) and Deci
(1975) suggested that intrinsically motivated behavior requires optimal challenge,
because people who are able to succeed in challenging tasks feel an higher sense of
competence (Deci and Ryan, 2000). As a consequence, the introduction of a goal
that makes the task more challenging and lead people to get hold of their abilities,
or even search for new ones, is likely to increase their perceived competence and
intrinsic motivation (Abuhamdeh and Csikszentmihalyi, 2012).
To summarize, let us draw some final considerations about the interaction be-
tween goal setting and intrinsic motivation. Despite our perplexity about a direct
connection between goal setting and intrinsic motivation in the activity (perplex-
ity determined by the above exposed analysis of the mechanisms that are said to
link goal setting to intrinsic motivation), several papers have proved that goals are
differently motivational by creating a gap between the present situation and a situ-
ation the subject aspires to achieve (Locke and Latham, 2002; 2006; Schröder and
Fishbach, 2015); the motivational power of goals has been captured even for initially
boring activity (Bryan and Locke, 1967; Mossholder, 1980), and even when they are
not related to monetary incentives (Goerg and Kube, 2012; Corgnet et al., 2015;
Goerg, 2015). Finally, the introduction of goals can effectively increase subjects’
intrinsic motivation at least by inducing them to use their abilities and to search for
new ones to reach the goals.
1.6 Concluding remarks
In the last decades, psychologists’ and economists’ interest has grown on intrinsic
motivation as a potential driver of people’s performance, and the relation between
intrinsic motivation and several positive outcomes has been repeatedly pointed out
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(Gagnè and Deci, 2005; Ryan and Deci, 2008; Gagnè et al., 2010; Van de Broeck et
al., 2013; Cerasoli et al., 2014; Kuvaas et al., 2017). However, most human activities
are not solely driven by the interest/enjoyment in the activity itself, but they are
rather moved also by other motivational forces. For example, let us consider a sales-
person whose main activity is to sell cars: he probably derives some enjoyment or
pleasure from the selling process itself, but for sure this is not his only motivation.
He is likely to receive a compensation, to be exposed to some form of control, to be
influenced by the work climate and culture, to develop some social relations with
his supervisor and his colleagues, to identify himself (totally, partially or not at all)
in his job or firm, to behave according to his personal goals and to externally set
goals.
The aim of this survey was indeed to review the possible effects deriving from
the interaction between intrinsic motivation and other sources of motivation, both
external (such as external interventions, social context, and externally set goals) and
internal (such as subjects’ identity and personal goals).
We illustrated the complex relation between external interventions and intrinsic
motivation, both from a psychological and from an economic point of view, by
highlighting the marked differences in approaches and methodologies. Psychological
studies have been mainly focused on what happens to subjects’ intrinsic motivation
when they are paid to complete interesting tasks, and then the reward is removed:
by referring mainly to self-determination theory, rewards are assumed to crowd-out
intrinsic motivation as long as they are perceived as controlling and not satisfy-
ing the human needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. On the other
hand, economic studies have explored the crowding-out effect as a change in per-
formance during the intervention provision, totally neglecting the initial interest in
the task and leaving aside the psychological forces that lead to this effect. Espe-
cially in the last decade, some papers have attempted to fill the distance between
these two strands of literature, and they have explored the relation between external
regulation, the satisfaction of the basic needs, and performance in the workplace:
moreover, they have proposed some management practices that are likely to fulfill
the psychological needs.
Then we interpreted the interaction between subjects’ intrinsic motivation and
external interventions in light of their social context. Several studies have suggested
that external interventions are likely to undermine not only subjects’ intrinsic moti-
vation, but also their reputational concerns; other papers have proved the crowding-
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out effects of controlling and monitoring devices, especially when the introduction
of these mechanisms is perceived as a signal of distrust. Moreover, the introduction
of external rewards has been proved to shift subjects’ decision frame from a social
frame to a monetary one: indeed, when people behave in a social frame, they do
their best regardless of their compensation, while when they think to be in a mon-
etary frame, the effort is strictly linked to the compensation received.
Thirdly, we describe the effects of the incorporation of subjects’ identity among
the motivational forces of their behavior: we proposed some studies pointing out
that intrinsic motivation and identity can be powerful drivers of people’s perfor-
mance, and that both of them can be either undermined or enhanced by external
interventions.
Finally, we explored how the presence of goals, either personal or externally speci-
fied, can affect intrinsic motivation. For what concerns the reason that lead a person
to engage in an activity, it has been suggested that when the activity is performed
with a mastery goal or a performance-approach goal, the subject is likely to become
more engaged in the task and more intrinsically motivated; moreover, intrinsic mo-
tivation is maximized when both the task-specific goal and the general purpose for
performing a task are aligned towards the same objective. On the other hand, also
externally set goals are said to be motivational, but we argued that in this context is
somehow difficult to relate this driver to an increase of intrinsic motivation: indeed,
a task with an externally set goal is likely to be no more perceived as an end in
itself, but rather as a means to fill the psychological discrepancy between the sub-
ject’s current position and the subject’s desired position (the attainment of the goal).
To conclude, the interaction between intrinsic motivation and the other forces
that drive people’s behavior results to be multifaceted and not easy to delineate,
mainly because several psychological components are at stake and need to be con-
sidered simultaneously. This paper offers an overview of some motivational forces
and their interplay, and provides some suggestion on how to relate to intrinsically
motivated people in order to preserve and even increase their motivation. Despite
this review is far from being comprehensive, hopefully it will help in shedding some
light on this still nebulous topic.
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CHAPTER 2
WAGE DELEGATION AND INTRINSIC
MOTIVATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL
STUDY
with Marco Faillo
The aim of this study is to investigate experimentally whether and to what ex-
tent subjects’ intrinsic motivation and performance change when they are allowed
to self-set their own wage for performing a task; moreover, it investigates how dif-
ferently motivated subjects react to the possibility of determining their own wage.
We propose a novel experimental design, in which the subjects are asked to perform
a complex real-effort task under two different conditions: wages can be either cho-
sen by the subjects themselves, or randomly determined. With this setting, we are
able to disentangle intrinsic motivation from the reciprocity concerns that are likely
to characterize the standard principal-agent interaction. Our main result is that
subjects increase their performance more when they are delegated the wage choice
than when they receive a random payment; moreover, subjects who are both highly
motivated and delegated their wage choice are those who perform better.
Keywords: Compensation, Incentives, Delegation, Motivation, Experiment.
JEL Classification: C91; J33; M52; M54
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2.1 Introduction
In most labor relations, employees performance can be neither perfectly ob-
served nor perfectly enforced; consequently, according to standard economic theory,
employees should exert the minimum effort and there is no reason for employers to
offer an above-minimum wage. Nevertheless, the quality of work has been theorized
to be positively influenced by an above-minimum wage in different ways (by reducing
shirking, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; by improving workers effort, Akerlof, 1982; by
reducing workers’ turnover, Salop, 1979; and so on); moreover, several experimental
papers have shown a positive relation between the wage offered and the effort exerted
(Fehr et al., 1993; Charness, 2004; Fehr et al., 2007; Falk et al., 2008; Fehr et al.,
2009; Charness et al., 2012), suggesting the importance of reciprocity in employment
relations. But increasing workers’ wages does not always ensure higher performance:
an ever-growing number of experimental studies has found that sometimes mone-
tary incentives and control devices can be detrimental for employees’ performance,
especially for those workers who are intrinsically motivated (Deci, 1971; Deci et al.,
1999; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Gneezy at al., 2011; Dessi and
Rustichini, 2015).
This issue raises the need to find an approach that could be complementary to
monetary compensation and that is likely to motivate employees to exert the desired
effort. A possible solution to this problem can be found by taking cue from some
HR practices effectively adopted in the real business management; indeed, in the
last few decades many companies have enhanced the discretionary power of their
employees in an attempt to increase their sense of responsibility, satisfaction, mo-
tivation, and consequently, productivity. For instance, the Brazilian manufacturing
company Semco is considered an example of workplace democracy: its employees
work in self-managed teams that are responsible for scheduling, setting their own
goals, and controlling the quality of their products. Some of them are allowed to set
their own wages and to choose a preferred payment structure among several options,
including the possibility to link their compensation to the achievement of self-set
annual goals (Semler, 1993, 1994, 2003). A growing number of firms have started
to implement empowerment policies and to increase the responsibility of their em-
ployees to the point of letting them decide their own wages; these firms notably
include Skyline Construction and Virgin. Companies using wage delegation claim
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that this policy is highly successful in terms of employee and customer satisfaction,
and company revenues.
Based on this promising anecdotal evidence, a stream of experimental literature
has developed on the effect of wage delegation on employees’ effort (Charness, 2000,
2004; Charness et al., 2012; Franke et al., 2016; Mellizo et al., 2014; Charness et
al., 2015; Jeworrek and Mertins, 2015). By investigating this effect in a laboratory
or in a controlled field setting, these studies have disentangled the wage delega-
tion effect from the effects of other policies usually implemented in those companies
with self-determined wages (e.g., more discretion about work-time or organization
in self-managed teams) (Jeworrek and Mertins, 2015). Moreover, several interpreta-
tions have been proposed of the causal connection that links participation in wage
choice and performance, and they refer mainly to (positive or negative) reciprocity
(Charness, 2004; Corgnet and Gonzàlez, 2014; Franke et al., 2016), or to the respon-
sibility alleviation effect (Charness et al., 2012). Only one experimental paper has
interpreted the causal link between wage delegation and performance by referring to
intrinsic motivation, and it proposes a positive effect of wage delegation on intrin-
sic motivation (Mellizo et al., 2014); they suggest that to the extent that workers’
voice satisfies their basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence and related-
ness, they are intrinsically motivated to produce more (Deci and Ryan, 1985; 2000a;
2000b)
The aim of our paper is to explore experimentally whether and to what extent
the wage delegation affects the intrinsic motivation and the performance of the
delegated employees; moreover, it investigates whether subjects with different levels
of intrinsic motivation react differently to wage delegation. In order to pursue these
aims we propose a novel design with a real-effort task: the subjects are asked to write
down as many words as possible that have to be related to one of these categories:
movies, flora and fauna, forenames, and food and beverage. We opt for such a
complex task in the hope that the participants will perceive it as interesting or even
enjoyable. Indeed, several studies have shown that the initial interest in the task
is a needed requirement to generate intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999; Fehr
and Falk, 2002; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003); moreover, they have suggested that
the effects of external interventions on intrinsic motivation (either undermining or
enhancing) occur only with activities of initial interest to participants (Calder and
Staw, 1975; Deci at al., 1999; Weibel et al., 2007; Dessi and Rustichini, 2015; Festrè
and Garrouste, 2015).
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Each session of our experiment is divided into two phases: in the first one the
payment is fixed, while the payment for the second one depends on the treatment.
In the control treatment the subjects are given a randomly determined wage, while
in the delegation treatment the subjects are delegated the choice of their own wage
level.1 Between phase 1 and phase 2, we introduce a free-choice period, that is a
non-paid period in which subjects have the possibility to keep on performing the
task, play tetris, or simply wait for the beginning of phase 2; the number of words
written during this free-choice period represents our first measure of intrinsic mo-
tivation (the behavioral measure). Our second measure of intrinsic motivation (the
self-reported measure) is derived from the questionnaire we give to the subjects at
the end of the experiment; this questionnaire’s items are aimed at reporting the
subjects’ interest/enjoyment in the task and their perceived competence.
The combination of free-choice behavior and self-reported interest is one of the
most adopted solution to the well-known problem of how to measure intrinsic mo-
tivation (Deci, 1971; Ryan et al., 1991; Deci et al., 1999), although neither of these
measurement tools is fully convincing (Fehr and Falk, 2002). For example, free-
choice behavior can be influenced by factors which differ completely from intrinsic
motivation concerns, such as loss aversion, negative reciprocity or signaling con-
cerns (see section 1.1.2); on the other hand, the self-reported measures of interest
are obtrusive and can be influenced by the subjects’ attempt to avoid cognitive dis-
sonance2: meaning that, individuals’ assessments of interest can be linked to how
they performed the task and not to the real enjoyment or interest. Through our
experimental design, we are able to disentangle the effects of a change in intrinsic
motivation from those arisen from loss aversion, negative reciprocity, or signaling
concerns; unfortunately, we can not solve the problems related to the self-reported
measure, but we reduce their salience by using a combination of the two measures.
Our first preliminary result support the previous studies on wage delegation and
shows that when subjects are delegated the wage choice, they increase more their
performance. Moreover, we find that subjects who are both delegated their wage
choice and highly motivated are those who perform better: this novel result suggests
that, in order to improve a strategy finalized at increasing subjects’ autonomy, it
1In the control treatment we randomly allocate the subjects to receive the same set of wages
which the subjects in the delegation treatment have self-chosen.
2According to the cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), an individual who experiences
cognitive dissonance (that is, the mental stress or discomfort experienced in performing an action
that is contradictory to one or more beliefs, ideas or values) is motivated to try to reduce it.
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should be useful to generate a climate that is likely to support their intrinsic motiva-
tion. Finally, and in line with the literature on the the interaction between intrinsic
motivation and external rewards, we find a negative correlation between motivation
and asked wage.
Our study contributes to the existing literature on wage delegation and intrinsic
motivation in at least two ways. First of all, we are unaware of any other work that
investigates directly the relation between wage delegation, intrinsic motivation, and
performance; only Mellizo et al. (2014) hypothesized that workers feel more intrin-
sically motivated when they have the right to vote for their own wage, but they did
not explored the consequential link between these three variables. Secondly, we at-
tempted to exclude the possibility that the effect of wage delegation on performance
could be mediated by positive reciprocity; that is, that agents could reciprocate to
the kind and trusting behavior of principals (that allow them to self-set their own
wage) by exerting higher effort. In order to pursue this aim, we decided not to
implement a principal-agent setting as it has been proposed in most studies on wage
delegation (Charness et al., 2012; Charness et al., 2013; Corgnet and Gonzalez, 2014;
Jeworrek and Mertins, 2015), but to let the subjects play individually by excluding
the principal from the setting. 3
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 examines the
related literature on delegation and intrinsic motivation; Section 2.3 describes our
experimental design; Section 2.4 illustrates our results and Section 2.5 concludes.
The instructions of the experiment and the final questionnaire from which we derive
the self-reported measure of intrinsic motivation are presented in Appendix A and B.
2.2 Related literature and hypotheses
2.2.1 Delegation
The economic studies that explore theoretically the effects of delegating author-
ity to employees have focused mainly on the following trade-off (Dougcouliagos,
3We are aware that, despite the individual nature of the task, reciprocity cannot be completely
ruled out because of the interactions between subjects and the experimenter; however, with respect
to the aboove mentioned studies, we attempted to reduce the possible impact of reciprocity by
relaxing the link between principal and agents..
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1995; Beckmann et al., 2015): on the one hand, the increased employees participa-
tion helps align employers’ and employees’ interests (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995);
it offers a way to employ workers’ knowledge in order to improve productivity and
production (Brickley et al., 1997; Aghion et al., 2014); and it encourages workers’
motivation (Bowles and Gintis, 1993; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Deci and Ryan, 2000)
and reciprocity (Homans, 1958; Blau, 1964) leading to higher effort. On the other
hand, it may lead to inefficient and costly management (Kremer, 1997), to a waste
of talent and resources (Williamson, 1980), and to free-rider problems (Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972).
The empirical data on workplace surveys, reports, and on uncontrolled field data,
have suggested a positive relation between workers’ participation in the decision-
making process and their performance, but there is insufficient and inadequate data
to estimate the strength and the determinants of this causal effect (Harrison, 2004;
Bryson et al., 2006; Golden, 2012; Goudswaard et al., 2012; De Varo and Prasad,
2013).
Because of this promising anecdotal evidence, in the last decade several experi-
mental studies have investigated how an increase in workers’ participation can affect
their performance, and have attempted to understand the causal link between par-
ticipation and performance. On the one hand, the experimental settings in which
workers do not have total autonomy in deciding their own wages lead to contro-
versial results: indeed, some evidence shows that workers increase their effort when
they are consulted and listened (Corgnet and Gonzàlez, 2014), while other suggests
that workers performance is not always influenced by the identity of the proposer of
the employment contract (Charness et al., 2013), or is even lower for workers who
have the right to participate in the wage choice (Franke et al., 2016).
On the other hand, a growing stream of experimental literature has shown that
employees’ performance tends to increase when they are totally delegated the choice
of their own wage or payment structure. Charness et al. (2012) provided clear evi-
dence that when employers delegated the wage choice to the employees, employees
were more willing to exert high effort both with one shot and with repeated inter-
actions. In Mellizo et al. (2014) setting, workers were assigned to groups of three
to solve some mathematical problems, and when they had the opportunity to vote
for the preferred compensation scheme their performance increased significantly. Fi-
nally, Jeworrek and Mertins (2015) conducted a natural field experiment by hiring
employees for a half-day data entry job: they observed not only the well-studied
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link between wage delegation and performance, but they also noticed higher perfor-
mance for those workers who did not have the decision right but knew that some
co-workers did.
2.2.2 Intrinsic motivation
An agent is said to be intrinsically motivated when "her primary focus is on
rewards inherent in engagement with the activity, like novelty of the task, enter-
tainment value, satisfaction of curiosity, and opportunities for the experience of
effectance and the attainment of mastery" (Gilbert et al., 1998: 566). On the other
hand, when a person has an extrinsic motivation orientation, the primary focus is
on rewards that are mediated by, but not part of the target activity: the activity is
seen as a "means to an end" (Kruglanski, 1975).
In the early 1970s, several studies began to investigate the effects of the inter-
action between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The pioneering experiment pre-
sented by Deci (1971) was the first to prove the existence of the so-called crowding
out effect: that is, by measuring intrinsic motivation as the amount of time during
a free choice situation which subjects spent working on a task, Deci’s experiment
showed that the introduction of extrinsic rewards undermined intrinsic motivation.
Following this influential paper, an extensive body of research has replicated and
expanded Deci (1971)’s results by investigating in which conditions the crowding-
out effect did arise and affect performance. The meta-analysis conducted by Deci
et al. (1999) well-summarized the evidence collected from more than 100 empirical
studies, showing that most tangible rewards significantly undermined the behavioral
measure of intrinsic motivation, except for performance-contingent reward and tan-
gible rewards connected to uninteresting activities.
One of the main theoretical arguments provided to explain crowding out effect
is based on the self-determination theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and
Deci, 2000; Vansteenkiste et al., 2008; Gagnè and Forest, 2011; Bowles and Polania-
Reyes, 2013; Festrè and Garrouste, 2015). This theory analyzes how environment
and social context affect the human innate psychological needs (Vansteenkiste et
al., 2008: 196): the need for competence, the need for relatedness, and the need for
autonomy. The specific focus of SDT is on the conditions that diminish or enhance
intrinsic motivation. For example, external interventions are assumed to have a
double meaning and their effects on intrinsic motivation depend on which aspect
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people perceive as more salient: to the extent that the controlling aspect is preva-
lent, external interventions will undermine intrinsic motivation; otherwise, to the
extent that the informational or supportive aspect is preponderant, SDT predicts
that external interventions will maintain or enhance intrinsic motivation. Indeed,
several studies have proved the enhancing effects of choice and the opportunity for
self-direction (Swann and Pittman, 1977; Zuckerman et al., 1978), acknowledgment
of feelings (Deci and Ryan, 1985), positive feedback (Deci, 1975), base pay level
(Kuvaas, 2006), and the presence of indirectly performance-salient incentives (Cera-
soli et al., 2014), as they allow people a greater sense of autonomy and/or perceived
competence (Ryan and Deci, 2000a, 2000b)(for a more comprehensive review, see
section 1.1.2).
2.2.3 Research Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis is strictly linked to the recent experimental literature on
wage delegation, suggesting that when subjects are allowed to decide their own
wage, they tend to perform better (Charness et al., 2012; Mellizo et al., 2014; Jew-
orrek and Mertins, 2015).
H1: When subjects are delegated their wage choice, they exert higher effort.
For what concerns the interaction between intrinsic motivation and performance,
several experimental studies have shown that highly motivated subjects tend to per-
form better, both in terms of quality and quantity (Callahan et al., 2003; Vansteenkiste
et al., 2004; Kuvaas, 2006; Kuvaas et al., 2016; for a review, see Cerasoli et al., 2014).
Moreover, Cerasoli et al. (2014) suggested that the effects of intrinsic motivation on
performance are mediated by those incentives that are indirectly salient with respect
to the performance: therefore we hypothesize that the highest effort is exerted by
those subjects who are highly motivated and have the possibility to choose their
wage.
H2a: Subjects with higher intrinsic motivation tend to perform better
than poorly motivated subjects.
H2b: Those subjects who are highly motivated and delegated their wage
choice are those who exert the highest effort.
Finally, we hypothesize that the delegation of the wage choice can be perceived
as a supportive intervention and therefore it can enhance subjects’ intrinsic motiva-
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tion. Indeed, when people receive the opportunity to self-set their own wage, both
their need for competence and their need for autonomy should be satisfied: accord-
ing to the self-determination theory, the satisfaction of these needs should crowd-in
intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000).
H3: When people are delegated their wage choice, their intrinsic motiva-
tion increases.
2.3 Experimental design and procedure
2.3.1 Treatments
In order to test our hypotheses, we ran a laboratory experiment with two treat-
ments: the Delegation treatment and the Control treatment. In both of them,
subjects are asked to write down as many words as possible that have to begin with
a given letter (that changes every three minutes) and have to be related to one of
these categories: movies, flora and fauna, forenames, and food and beverage. The
experiment is completely computerized and participants’ performance is measured
as the number of words written in the right category. At the end of the experiment,
they are asked to respond to a questionnaire in order to self-set their perceived com-
petence in completing the task, and their intrinsic motivation/interest to perform
it. This questionnaire is derived from the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI), that
has been proposed by several other authors (Ryan, 1982; Ryan et al., 1991; Deci
et al., 1994). We use only eleven items from this 45-items inventory, 7 items from
the interest/enjoyment sub-scale and 4 from the perceived competence scale;4 the
subjects are asked to answer to each item through a 7-points Likert scale, going
from "I strongly disagree"(1) to "I strongly agree"(7). The answers to the inter-
est/enjoyment sub-scale allow us to calculate the self-reported measure of intrinsic
motivation, while the answers to the perceived competence sub-scale allow us to
calculate the subjects’ perceived competence, which is theorized to be positively
4The main reason we decide to use only eleven items from the inventory is to avoid redundancy,
due to the fact that the list of items is long and several items of the inventory are rather similar.
Moreover, by looking at the previous studies on intrinsic motivation, it becomes clear that the
authors used different items and sub-scales of the IMI inventory, depending on the experimental
framework and on the tasks (Ryan et al., 1983; McAuley et al., 1989; Ryan and Connel, 1989;
Monteiro et al., 2015). It suggests that it is a rather common practice to adjust the inventory
according to the experimental needs.
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related to both the self-reported measure and the behavioral measure of intrinsic
motivation. The self-reported measure of intrinsic motivation represents our ex-post
measure of motivation. After the completion of this questionnaire, the subjects are
asked to respond to few socio-demographic questions, and then they are paid in a
separate room.
Delegation treatment
It is composed by two phases and both phases last for 15 minutes. Before the
beginning of the first phase, subjects are told that for the first phase they will re-
ceive a fixed wage of 20 tokens (1 token = 0.25 euro), while for the second phase
they will be delegated the choice of their own wage by deciding which wage they
want to receive for the second phase into a range between 0 and 30 tokens. Then
the first phase begins, and each participant has to write down words for 15 minutes
without any interruption. After the first phase, a free-choice period is introduced
in which participants are told that for six minutes they can do whatever they want:
they can keep on inserting words, play tetris, use their cellphones, or simply wait
for the beginning of the next phase. Participants also know that for the free-choice
period they will not receive any compensation. The number of words written dur-
ing this free-choice period represents the ex-ante (behavioral) measure of intrinsic
motivation; we refer to the free-choice behavior as an ex-ante measure because it
is collected before the introduction of the effective treatment. At the end of the
free-choice period, subjects are asked to type the wage they want to receive for the
second phase; after that, the second phase starts and its structure is identical to the
first one. After the end of the second phase, the subjects are given the questionnaire
and then paid.
Control Treatment:
The only difference between the Delegation Treatment and the Control Treat-
ment is that, in the last one, participants do not have the possibility to self-set their
own wage at the beginning of phase two; instead, their wages are randomly deter-
mined from the wage distribution generated by those subjects who are delegated the
choice of their wage in the Delegation Treatment. Therefore, they are told about
their second phase wage only before the beginning of the second phase.
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2.3.2 Procedure
The experiment was run at the University of Trento with 156 voluntary partici-
pants: eighty subjects participated in the four sessions of the Control treatment, and
seventy-six in the four sessions of the Delegation treatment. We exclude 1 obser-
vation from the Control treatment and 3 from the Delegation treatment for lack of
available data, therefore we used 152 observations. All participants were undergrad-
uate students, most of them were male (58%), they were on average about 22 years
old, about half of them were enrolled in an economics major (54%), and on average
they have already participated to almost 8 experiment. No subject participated in
more than one treatment or session. All the experimental subjects received a show
up fee of 3 euro, and they earned on average 15.24 euro (including the show up fee).
Each session lasted about 1 hour/1 hour and 30 minutes.
All sessions were computerized and conducted in the CEEL (Cognitive and Exper-
imental Economics Laboratory), using the Delphi software5. At the beginning of
each session, participants were asked to seat randomly in the lab and the instruc-
tions were read aloud by one experimenter: they were asked to play individually and
no participant was allowed to observe other players’ outcome. Participants played
for 10 rounds (plus two rounds during the free-choice period) in 6 sessions and for
12 rounds (plus two) in 2 sessions, one with the Control treatment and one with the
Delegation treatment. In these last two sessions we introduced a preliminary phase
before the beginning of the real experiment in order to let the subjects familiarize
with the task, but the results were not significantly different from those of the other
sessions; therefore, we pooled all the results together.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Provided effort
Table 2.1 summarizes the number of words written during each round across the
different phases of our experiment, the average wage received in phase 1 and the
average wage chosen (in Delegation treatment, from now on DT) or received (in
Control treatment, from now on CT) for phase 2: in the first column we pooled the
data of both treatments, in the second column we consider only the data from the
CT and in the third column we consider only the data from the DT.
5We warmly thank Marco Tecilla for developing the software we used for the experiment.
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Table 2.1: Summary of effort (n° of words per round) and wage by treatment
Overall Control Delegation
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
N° of words in phase 1 12.63 (3.63) 13.19 (3.48) 12.03 (3.73)
N° of words in free-choice period 7.24 (5.78) 7.1 (5.44) 7.41 (6.17)
N° of words in phase 2 13.38 (4.35) 13.5 (4.34) 13.25 (4.40)
Wage 1 20 (0) 20 (0) 20 (0)
Wage 2 28.98 (2.76) 28.99 (2.74) 28.97 (2.80)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
The first result that we can observe is in line with the previous literature on the
gift-exchange game: when subjects are given higher wages, they exert higher effort.
Indeed, the first column of Table 2.1 shows how overall participants earn significantly
higher wages in phase 2 with respect to phase 1 (p < 0.01, two-tailed Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test) and exert higher effort (p < 0.01, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test). It appears clearly that the main driver of this result is participants’
behavior in DT: when subjects are delegated their wage choice, the increase in per-
formance between phase 1 and phase 2 (measured as the difference in number of
words written in phase 1 and in phase 2) is much higher than when they are given a
random wage (p<0.01 in DT, one-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test; p = 0.38 in
CT). It is worthwhile to recall that in phase 1 subjects are paid independently from
their performance in both treatments, thus we can consider the effort they exert in
phase 1 as a proxy for their ability in the task; for that reason we are not interested
in the absolute measure of effort exerted in phase 2, but rather on the change in
performance between phase 1 and phase 2 as the effect of the introduction of our
treatment.
Result 1: People increase more their effort when they are delegated their wage
choice than when they are assigned a random wage.
Moreover, by comparing the increase in performance between phase 1 and phase
2 in CT and DT controlling for the ex-ante motivation, it appears that participants’
performance is significantly higher in DT than in CT independently from their
intrinsic motivation (p = 0.03, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test); meaning
that, subjects with the same ex-ante intrinsic motivation tend to increase more their
effort when they are given the possibility to self-set their own wage.
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Table 2.2: OLS regression on effort exerted in phase 2
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 4.137+ 3.255 12.344
(2.482) (2.388) (8.551)
Phase 1 0.899*** 0.803*** 0.928***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.103)
Wage -0.014 0.071 0.079
(0.456) (0.437) (0.432)
Free-choice - 0.412*** 0.154
(0.110) (0.165)
Phase1 x treat - - -0.249+
(0.141)
Free x treat - - 0.468*
(0.222)
Observations 152 152 152
Adjusted R2 0.542 0.580 0.590
+ p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Our dependent variable is the number of words written in phase 2. The independent variables are a dummy
variable which is equal to 1 in DT (Treatment) the number of words written during phase 1 (Phase 1 ), and the
wage asked/received (Wage). In Column 2 we introduce the number of words during the free choice period
(Free-choice); in Column 3 are added the interaction between treatment and n° of words written in phase 1 (Phase
1 x treat), and between treatment and n° of words written during free-choice period (Free x treat). Our control
variables are gender, age, course of study, income and number of past experiments.
Result 2: People with the same intrinsic motivation tend to increase more their
effort when they are delegated their wage choice.
In order to gain some insight into the determinants of subjects’ performance, we
run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the effort exerted in phase 2. Col-
umn (1) of Table 2.2 presents the results of an OLS regression on the effort exerted
in phase 2 in both treatments, where the explanatory variables are a dummy vari-
able which is equal to 1 in DT (Treatment), the number of words written during the
first phase (Phase 1 ), and the wage asked or received (Wage). We control also for
subjects heterogeneity: our control variables are gender, age, income, education (a
dummy equal to 1 when subjects attend courses of economics or management) and
number of past experiments. In Column (2) we control also for the number of words
written during the free-choice period (Free-choice), that we consider as a measure of
subjects’ ex-ante motivation. Column (3) adds the interactions between treatment
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and subjects’ ability (Phase 1 x treat) and between subjects’ ex-ante motivation
and treatment (Free x treat). From the observation of this Table, we can derive
mainly two conclusions: on the one hand, it becomes clear that the effort exerted
in phase 2 is strongly influenced by subjects’ ability in both treatments, although
in DT the effect of subjects’ ability in determining their effort is significantly lower.
On the other hand, we can notice that neither our treatment nor subjects’ intrinsic
motivation is able to influence subjects’ effort per se, but when we consider the in-
teraction between these two variables, the effect on subjects’ effort is positive and
significant. It means that only when subjects are both delegated their wage choice
and intrinsically motivated, they will increase their performance.
Result 3: People who are both delegated their wage choice and highly motivated
are those who perform better.
2.4.2 Wage
For what concerns subjects’ wages, we have to look again at Table 2.1: for con-
struction, each subject in DT has the possibility to decide his own wage for phase 2
and the wages’ distribution in CT is the same of DT. Therefore, Wage 2 has almost
the same mean and standard deviation in DT and CT6.
First of all, it should be not underestimated the result that not all the participants
in DT chose the highest possible wage : 17 subjects over 73 (almost 18%) asked for a
wage which is lower than 30. Even more interestingly, the decision of asking a lower
wage is not correlated with a low ability in the task; instead, we find a negative
correlation between the asked wage and subjects’ ex-ante motivation (Spearman’s
ρ = -0.18, p = 0.06). Although this results is driven by few participants’ behav-
ior, it suggests that more motivated subjects tend to ask for lower wages while less
intrinsically-motivated subjects ask for a wage premium to perform more, and it
seems to be in line with all the literature regarding intrinsic motivation: this evi-
dence represents an intriguing spark, but more observations need to be collected to
make it more reliable.
Finally, we compare the increase in performance between phase 1 and phase 2
controlling for the wage in DT and in CT; we found that it is much higher when
6The slight differences are due to the fact that we exclude some observations from DT and CT
for lack of available data
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Table 2.3: Correlation between measures of intrinsic motivation
Free-choice ratio Intrinsic motivation Competence
Free-choice ratio 1 – –
Intrinsic motivation 0.29 1 –
(0.000)
Competence 0.19 0.47 1
(0.008) (0.000)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
subjects have the possibility to self-set their wage (p = 0.02, two-tailed Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test) 7. It means that, regardless of the wage received, subjects
perform better when they are given the possibility to choose it; this result seems to
suggest that one powerful driver of performance could be not the wage itself, but
rather the possibility to determine it.
Result 4: Regardless of the wage received, subjects perform better when they
have the possibility to determine it.
2.4.3 Intrinsic motivation
As above mentioned, we use another measure of intrinsic motivation that is cal-
culated starting from a questionnaire proposed at the end of the experiment, the
Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI): from the analysis of this questionnaire, we
were able to calculate both the self-reported measure of intrinsic motivation, and
the subjects’ perceived competence.
First of all, it is important to verify whether the two measures of intrinsic mo-
tivation (the effort during the free-choice period and the self-reported measure) are
correlated: Table 2.3 shows that the correlation is positive and significant (ρ=0.29
and p= 0.000, Spearman correlation test), therefore we find some support to our
choice of using these two measures together. Our results also support the theorized
relation between perceived competence and free-choice behavior (ρ=0.19, p=0.0008),
and between perceived competence and self-reported intrinsic motivation (ρ=0.47,
7That is, we compare the ratio between the difference in effort between phase 1 and phase 2
and the wage, and we found that in DT is much higher (mean 0.20, SD = 0.5) than in CT (mean
0.05, SD = 0.48)
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Table 2.4: Self-reported measures of intrinsic motivation by treatment
Overall Control Delegation
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Intrinsic motivation 4.35 (1.46) 4.29 (1.55) 4.41 (1.35)
Competence 3.1 (1.11) 3.02 (1) 3.18 (1.22)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 2.5: OLS regression on self-reported measure of intrinsic motivation
DT CT
Phase 1 0.008 0.022*
(0.009) ( 0.011)
Free-choice 0.025+ 0.036*
(0.014) (0.017)
Wage -0.123+ -0.053
(0.065) (0.061)
Observations 73 79
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.175
+ p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Our dependent variable is the the self-reported measure of intrinsic motivation. The independent variables are the
number of words written during phase 1 (Phase 1 ), during the free choice period (Free-choice), and the wage
asked/received (Wage). Our control variables are gender, age, course of study, income and number of past
experiments.
p=0.000). Moreover, we found that perceived competence is actually linked to sub-
jects’ initial ability in the task (ρ=0.26, p=0.000).
Result 5: The behavioral measure and the self-assessed measures of intrinsic
motivation are positively correlated.
The next step is comparing the different self-reported measures of intrinsic moti-
vation in DT and in CT. Table 2.4 summarizes the results obtained for the self-report
measures of intrinsic motivation and perceived competence by treatment: as we can
see, both intrinsic motivation and competence are higher in DT than in CT, but
none of these differences is significant.
In order to understand whether there are some differences in the determinants
shaping ex-post intrinsic motivation in the two treatments, we run some OLS re-
gressions on the self-reported measure of intrinsic motivation separately for CT and
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DT. Columns DT of Table 2.5 refers to delegation treatment, while columns CT
refers to control treatment; the dependent variable is the self-reported measure of
intrinsic motivation. The independent variables are the number of words written
during phase 1 (Phase 1 ), during the free choice period (Free-choice), and the wage
asked or received (Wage). We control for subjects heterogeneity. From the observa-
tion of Table 2.5 it appears clearly that the ex-post measure of intrinsic motivation
is positively and significantly correlated to subjects’ ex-ante motivation, both in CT
and in DT. For what concerns the other determinants, we need to consider sep-
arately the two treatments. The first intriguing result found in DT is that final
intrinsic motivation is not influenced by subjects’ initial ability: it means that when
subjects are delegated their wage choice for completing a task, they can report to be
intrinsically motivated even if they are not so able in its completion. On the other
hand, to explain the negative wage effect on ex-post motivation, it is worthwhile to
remember that higher levels of ex-ante motivation are found to be linked to lower
asked wages; therefore, it can be supposed that higher wages could be asked by
less motivated subjects who experience more disutility from the task (with respect
to more motivated subjects), but despite this monetary premium their motivation
keeps on being low. Moreover, we can hypothesize that those subjects who ask for
higher wages can be affected by an over-justification effect: this effect appears when
motivated individuals are exposed to outside incentives, therefore their behavior
becomes over-justified (by intrinsic motivation and external rewards). As a conse-
quence, they reduce the factor that they can control, that is intrinsic motivation
(Frey, 1997).
For what concerns the control treatment, the table shows that the other main deter-
minant of subjects’ ex-post motivation is their initial ability in the task: this result
suggests that, in the control treatment, subjects’ self-reported intrinsic motivation
in performing a task is influenced both by their initial intrinsic motivation and their
ability in completing it.
Summarizing, the self-reported measure of intrinsic motivation is positively in-
fluenced by ex-ante motivation both in DT and in CT; furthermore, when subjects
are delegated their wage choice, those subjects who ask for higher wages report lower
ex-post motivation. Finally, participants’ final intrinsic motivation is influenced by
their initial ability only when they are not allowed to self-set their own wage.
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2.5 Concluding remarks
By investigating the relation between wage delegation, intrinsic motivation and
performance, this study attempts to help in sheding some light over the determi-
nants that lead people to perform better when they are given the possibility to
self-set their wage; moreover, it addresses the issue of how differently motivated
subjects behave when they are given the possibility to determine their own wage. In
order to pursue these aims, we used a novel experimental design in which the sub-
jects are asked to perform a complex real-effort task under two different conditions:
the subjects’ wages can be either chosen by the subjects themselves, or randomly
determined. Our results show that when subjects are delegated their own wage
choice, they tend to increase more their performance than when they are assigned
a random wage; our first result clearly supports what the literature on wage dele-
gation has already suggested. Furthermore, we find that highly motivated subjects
who have the possibility to self-set their wage are those who perform better. Finally,
it should not be disregarded the unforeseen negative link between subjects’ ex-ante
intrinsic motivation and the wage that they ask; despite it represents only a hint
because it is determined by few subjects’ behavior, it seems an intriguing evidence
to be deepened with further research. Indeed, this result suggests that highly moti-
vated subjects exploit the possibility to show that their good performance is driven
by their real interest in the task rather than by an high wage; on the other hand,
poorly motivated subjects are willing to complete the task that they do not enjoy
only if they are substantially remunerated.
Nevertheless, the self-reported measure of intrinsic motivation does not seem to
be much affected by our treatment. It means that subjects’ final intrinsic moti-
vation in the task does not change whether they have the possibility to determine
their wage or not. Maybe the problem is in the nature itself of this measure: by
deriving it from a questionnaire, it risks to be a so-fleeting kind of measure that
it could be affected by other variables we cannot control for. One possible solu-
tion is to use the behavioral measure of intrinsic motivation both before and after
the introduction of the delegation treatment, in order to have a clearer idea of the
impact of letting subjects decide their wage and to make these measures compa-
rable. Another determinant of this result is likely to be linked to the exclusion of
the principal from the experimental setting: probably when the delegation of the
wage choice is extrapolated from the principal-agent context, it ceases to be a tool
to recognize subjects’ capability of making decisions or their competence in per-
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forming the task. As a consequence, even when subjects are allowed to self-set their
own wage, neither their need for competence nor their need for autonomy is satisfied.
With this novel experiment we attempted to provide a contribution to the exist-
ing literature on the interaction between intrinsic motivation and external rewards,
also from a methodological point of view. Further investigations could certainly
help in understanding which could be the most appropriate task to generate intrin-
sic motivation, which could be most suitable experimental design for disentangling
intrinsic motivation from other effects, and which are the most fitting measures of
intrinsic motivation.
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CHAPTER 3
CASH POSTERS IN THE LAB
with Marco Faillo and Luigi Mittone
Our paper reproduces the cash posters framework à la Homans (1953, 1954) in
a laboratory setting with a twofold aim: first of all, it explores the gift-exchange
between employers and employees, both in terms of wage-effort and in terms of
effort-potential leniency in punishment; secondly, it investigates whether employees’
behavior is driven also by solidarity concerns towards their unlucky peers. We pro-
pose a novel experimental design with a modified version of the gift-exchange game
with real effort, punishment, and multiple rounds (Fehr et al., 1997): each employer
is matched with two employees and she has the possibility to punish each of them
if their individual production is lower than that asked. Each employee’s production
risks to be reduced by a random intervention and, in our treatment, each employee
has the possibility to renounce to a part of his production to give it to his coworker.
Our data support the well-known relation between wage and effort, but suggest that
employers are not willing to overlook employees non-compliance, neither when em-
ployees exerted high effort in the past, nor when their coworkers exert high effort. In
our treatment, employees not only exploit the possibility to help their needy peers,
but they tend also to exert higher effort towards their employers. Consequently,
the employers are those who earn more from employees’ solidarity, and the gap in
earnings between employers and employees becomes even greater in our treatment.
Keywords: Solidarity, Gift-exchange, Reciprocity, Experiment.
JEL Classification: C91; M52; D91; D81
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3.1 Introduction
In a famous study conducted at the Costumers Accounting Division of the Boston
Edison Company, George Homans (1953, 1954) spent several months in observing
the social relations among some clerical workers. His focus was mainly on a group of
ten young cash posters whose job consisted in recording customers’ payments: since
their duties were rather repetitive and their performance easy to monitor, they rep-
resented the perfect target for a field study aimed at combining "the measurement of
individual effectiveness with the systematic observation of social behavior" (Homans,
1954: p. 724).
Cash posters were required to pull at least 300 cards per hour and they were paid a
flat wage. Beside that, they received no monetary incentive: neither a punishment
for those who failed in reaching the quota, nor a prize for those who outperformed the
requested minimum. Nevertheless, the average number of cards per hour recorded
by Homans was more than 17 percent higher than the minimum quota required
by the company; moreover, few subjects worked almost 50 percent more than the
standard requested (Akerlof, 1982). From the observation of this data, at least one
question arises: since there were not economic incentives, why did the cash posters
work so hard?
Years later, George Akerlof (1982) interpreted cash posters’ behavior by refer-
ring to the concept of gift-exchange: according to this interpretation, the excess of
effort exerted by the cash posters was seen as a gift to the firm. Because of the
essential reciprocal nature of gift-giving (Mauss, 1954), the gift given by the clerical
workers was expected to be exchanged with appropriate gifts given by the firm: first
of all, cash posters were remunerated with an above the minimum wage. Besides
that monetary gift, the firm repaid cash posters’ effort with a twofold leniency in
the work rules. Firstly, potential leniency for future errors or slowdown: meaning
that, by exerting higher effort in the present, each clerical worker could build a sort
of self-insurance for her own future slackness. Secondly, the firm reciprocated to
the high performance of some cash posters by reducing the pressure on all of them;
therefore, the hard-workers could benefit from the firm’s generous treatment of those
coworkers who perceive work rules as a constraint (Akerlof, 1982).
Since among the cash posters it was rather simple to distinguish the hard-workers
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from the poor performers, we can presume that hard-workers’ behavior was also
driven by solidarity with their slower coworkers. There is a profound difference be-
tween the driver of workers’ behavior towards the firm (reciprocity) and the driver
of workers’ behavior towards their coworkers (solidarity): indeed, reciprocity implies
the expectation of receiving something back, while solidarity is "a willingness to help
people in need who are similar to oneself but victims of outside influences" (Selten
and Ockenfels, 1998: 518). We suggest to incorporate also solidarity concerns among
the drivers of cash posters’ behavior, despite Akerlof (1982) never broached them
in his analysis, by pointing out a probable relation between the "outside influences"
mentioned by Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and the random distribution of ability at
work between cash-posters; furthermore, we argue that those who were more able
in cash-posting were willing to help the others because of their empathy with the
coworkers in need.
The relation between firm and workers has been widely studied as a gift-exchange.
The seminal paper by Fehr et al. (1993) was the first to introduce the gift-exchange
game to mimic a labor relation in an experimental setting, and it confirmed the
positive relation between wage and effort observed in Homans (1953). Starting from
this influential study, several papers have expanded the basic setting proposed by
Fehr and colleagues with the aim of exploring in which conditions reciprocity does
survive. For example, some experimental works have investigated whether workers
are still moved by reciprocal concerns when there are multiple employees working
for the same employer (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Maximiano et al., 2007; Gächter et
al., 2012); they showed that workers are very sensitive to peers’ behavior, and that
their reciprocity holds out and even increases if workers observe others behaving
reciprocally. Another stream of literature has developed on settings in which the
employer has the possibility to respond to workers’ behavior through fines and/or
rewards (Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr et al., 2007). Here the
results are more mixed: when employers have the possibility of both punishing and
rewarding after the observation of workers’ effort, both employers and workers tend
to behave more reciprocally (Fehr et al., 1997); moreover, when employers have de-
cided a priori whether to punish or to reward workers’ behavior, workers’ reciprocity
is much higher with a rewarding contract (Fehr et al., 2007); finally, when employ-
ers have no power in choosing the preferred contract (among a trust one and an
incentive one), both employers and workers are less willing to reciprocate under the
incentive contract (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Moreover, other experimental studies
have proved that reciprocity survives (at least in the short term) also in settings
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with real effort tasks (Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare and Shearer, 2009; 2011;
Carpenter, 2017).
Despite the large number of studies on reciprocity between employers and em-
ployees, to the best of our knowledge, no study has investigated the interaction
between reciprocity and another factor that is likely to drive employees’ behavior:
solidarity. Solidarity concerns have been explored, separately, by a narrow stream of
experimental literature starting with the pioneering study by Selten and Ockenfels
(1998): they proposed a solidarity game in which participants were asked to play
a one-shot three-players game, and they had the possibility either to win a certain
amount of money or to receive anything. Before the random drawn, each of them
was asked how much he/she was willing to give to the loser(s) in the group in the
case he/she won the amount of money; therefore, these transfers were conditional
on being a winner. This game creates a situation in which "ex ante everybody is in
the same situation but the ex post distribution of payoffs may be very uneven unless
the inequality is mitigated by positive conditional gifts" (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998:
531), and it was found that these conditional gifts were actually substantial.
But the structure of the solidarity game, as presented by Selten and Ockenfels
(1998), risks to be far from representing the complex workplace dynamics observed
by Homans. First of all, the framework of the solidarity game is such that all the
players have the same informations, make the same decisions simultaneously, and
there is no conflict of interests nor interaction among them: therefore, it totally lacks
the principal-agent nature which is typical of labor relations (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Secondly, in the standard solidarity game subjects decide on how to split an
amount of money which is given to them by the experimenter. It is very difficult to
observe situations like this in reality. In addition, it has been largely proven that
when subjects have to earn their endowment before deciding how to split it in a
dictator game, they tend to become more selfish than when they receive money as
a windfall (Cherry et al., 2002; Cherry and Shogren, 2008; Reinstein and Riener,
2009; Mittone and Ploner, 2012; Carlsson et al., 2013).
Our study falls between these two strands of experimental research, with the aim
of filling the gap among them in representing a workplace framework in which the
workers are moved also by solidarity concerns. We propose a novel design with a
modified version of the gift-exchange game, in which workers are allowed to show
their solidarity concerns. Players are assigned a role that can be either employer
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or employee, and each employer is matched with two employees: in the baseline
(Control Treatment, CT), people within each group play together for 10 rounds
(partners matching). The structure of the game is as follows: in the first phase of
each round, each employer proposes a contract (s, smin, p∗) to both her employees1:
s represents a wage, smin a minimum wage that is lower than s, and p∗ is the asked
level of effort. The employees have the possibility to see the proposed contract,
then they are asked to exert an individual real effort by counting the exact number
of 1 in tables composed by 0 and 1 for 90 seconds. Each player knows that after
these 90 seconds, each of the following events has the same probability to occur: 1)
the production of employee 1 is halved, 2) the production of employee 2 is halved,
3) nor the production of employee 1 nor the production of employee 2 is halved.
We introduce this random device in order to let employees’ final performance be
determined not only by their effort, but also by an event that is independent from
their behavior; this is aimed at mimicking those uncertain events that in real life
can modify individuals productivity, despite of the effort produced (such as unfore-
seen inconveniences in workplace, familiar problems, machinery malfunctions, and
so on). Before knowing which of these events will effectively happen, each employee
decides how to allocate his production between himself and his employer: for each
kept table he earns 0.4 tokens, for each table given to the employer, the latter earns
0.6 tokens.2 The number of tables effectively given to the employer by one employee
represents his effective effort p. If p ≥ p∗ the employer is forced to pay him the
higher wage s, while if p < p∗ the employer can choose either to pay him the wage
s or the minimum wage smin. After the payment of the wage, the round ends.
We compare this baseline with a Solidarity treatment (ST), in which each em-
ployee is allowed to allocate his production of tables between himself, his employer,
and also his coworker in the three above mentioned hypothetical situations. If some
tables are given to the coworker, these tables are directly passed from the coworker
to the employer, and the employer perceive them as coming from the coworker. In-
deed, the employer is not aware of the table exchange between her employees, but
she is only able to see the final number of tables received by each of them.
We decided to implement such a complex design in order to mimic the cash posters
framework as close as possible and to capture solidarity concerns: indeed, with this
1For simplicity, from now on we refer to employer as female, and to employee as male.
2These parameters are aimed at representing a situation in which the tables are profitable for
the employee that decides to keep them for himself, but when they are given to the employer the
amount of wealth generated is even higher.
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setting we are able to explore the gift-exchange observed by Homans (1953, 1954),
both in terms of wage-effort relation and in terms of effort-potential leniency. More-
over, we can test whether lucky workers 3 are moved also by solidarity concerns
towards unlucky coworkers.
We find that some behaviors are effectively moved by reciprocity concerns: for
example, the minimum wage offered by the employers is higher than the minimum
possible, and employees’ effort is positively influenced by the offered wage. However,
we do not find the relation between effort and potential leniency hypothesized by Ak-
erlof (1982): indeed, employers are not willing to forgive employees’ non-compliance,
neither when the employees themselves exerted high effort in the past, nor when the
employers receive high effort from the coworkers. Furthermore, our data show that
when employees are allowed to show their solidarity towards their coworkers, they
effectively exploit this possibility; this solidarity concern is found to be influenced
also by a sort of reciprocity towards coworkers, meaning that employees are more
supportive towards those coworkers who have helped them in the previous round.
Moreover, in the solidarity treatment employees are unexpectedly willing to exert
higher effort towards their employers. As a consequence, the employers become the
greatest beneficiaries of the solidarity drivers, and the gap between employers’ and
employees’ payoffs is even higher in the solidarity treatment.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 illustrates our
research hypotheses; Section 3.3 describes our experimental design and procedure;
Section 3.4 illustrates our results and Section 3.5 concludes. The instructions of the
experiment are presented in Appendix C.
3.2 Research Hypotheses:
If both the employer and the employees were perfectly rational and selfish agents,
and the frame was characterized by common knowledge, their aim should be the
maximization of their own payoff and we can develop some predictions about their
behavior. Starting the analysis from the last phase, the employer should never pay
the higher wage if she is not forced to. Since the employee can predict this behavior,
he should decide how many tables consign to the employer according to these simple
3We define "lucky" those workers whose number of tables is not halved, and consequently those
who know that their wage will be s for sure.
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considerations: first of all, he should check whether the offered wage is appropriate
for the asked effort. Indeed, it is easy to suppose that an employee will exert the
asked effort p∗ as long as the offered wage is at least equal to 0.4p∗; when this is
not the case, the employee will maximize his payoff by keeping all the tables for
himself. Secondly, the employee should compare his effective effort with the asked
effort: if the number of tables completed is lower than p∗, there is no reason to give
a positive amount of tables to the employer. Moreover, the employee should never
give any tables to the coworker (in ST), because it would directly lower his own
payoff; finally, assuming that the effort of completing tables is costly and that the
cost of completing tables is increasing and convex, he would complete tables until
the marginal cost of completing tables would become higher than the benefit he gets
from each completed table (0.4 tokens).
To conclude the analysis, in the first phase the employer should propose a contract
with these two properties: first of all, the asked effort and the offered wage should
be related in such a way that s = 0.4p∗; secondly, the minimum wage should be
equal to 0.
Nonetheless, as we have already mentioned, a huge body of literature has shown
that people’s behavior is driven by other forces besides the selfish concerns, such as
the desire to reciprocate kindness or to punish unkind behaviors (Fehr et al., 1993;
Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr et al., 2007; Fehr et al., 2009; Charness et al., 2012), but also
empathy and solidarity with people in need (Selten and Ockenfels 1998; Eberlein
and Przmeck, 2006; Buchner et al, 2007).
Therefore, we hypothesize that the employer’s decision about the contract can be
determined also by her desire to induce a reciprocal behavior into her employees: as
a consequence, she can offer a wage which is higher than (or at least equal to) the
minimum acceptable for the asked level of effort (s ≥ 0.4p∗). And again, she can
offer a minimum wage which is higher than zero and she can pay the higher wage
even when she is not forced to, especially to an employee who has already given a
number of tables higher than that asked.
H01: The employer offers a contract in such a way that the wage is, on av-
erage, not greater than the minimum acceptable for the asked level of effort.
H02: The offered minimum wage is, on average, equal to zero.
H03: The employer exploits the possibility to pay the minimum wage all
the times that an employee gives her a number of tables p < p∗.
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From the side of the employee, if also his behavior is effectively influenced by
reciprocity considerations, we can expect that his effort is positively influenced by
the wage proposed by his employer. Moreover, we can hypothesize that even if the
employee is not able to give the asked level of effort, he is likely to consign to the em-
ployer a number of tables that is greater than zero, even just to show off his goodwill.
H04: The number of tables given by one employee to the employer is equal
to the number of asked tables only when the offered wage is at least equal
to 0.4p∗; otherwise, the employee gives zero tables.
H05: When the employee is not able to give the asked level of effort, he
consigns to the employer zero tables.
If we compare ST with CT under the hypothesis of rationality, the two treat-
ments should be extremely similar in terms of results: indeed, there is no reason for
employees to give any tables to the coworkers, since this behavior generates only a
cost for them. However, given the before mentioned definition of solidarity (Selten
and Ockenfels, 1998; Bierhoff and Fetchenhauer, 2001; Buchner et al., 2007), we can
suppose that in ST participants’ behavior could be driven even by horizontal soli-
darity concerns: that is, we hypothesize that in ST each employee is willing to help
the coworker who finds himself in difficulty by consigning him some of his completed
tables. Moreover, since the essential basis of solidarity is to help someone in need,
we can suppose that an employee should be more willing to help his coworker when
his coworker founds himself in effectively unlucky circumstances (i.e., his tables are
reduced). Finally, employees’ behavior in ST should be influenced also by reciprocity
concerns: indeed, because of the partner matching protocol, each employee could
expect to be treated kindly by his coworker if he treats him kindly. That is, one
employee could give some completed tables to his coworker not only because he is
willing to help him, but also because he expects to induce his coworker to give him
some tables in the successive rounds. But if an employee discovers that his coworker
is not willing to give him some of his completed tables, it can destroys employee’s
reciprocity and, consequently, the number of exchanged tables is likely to drop down.
H06: The number of tables effectively given by an employee to his coworker
is, on average, equal to 0.
58
3.3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
3.3 Experimental design and procedure
3.3.1 Treatments
In order to test these hypotheses, we ran a laboratory experiment that consists
of two treatments: the Control treatment, and the Solidarity treatment. Each of
them represents a modified version of the gift-exchange game with punishment, as
that presented by Fehr et al. (1997).
Control treatment:
At the beginning of each session, participants are randomly divided in employers and
employees; then, groups of three people (1 employer and 2 employees) are formed.
Participants are randomly and anonymously grouped, therefore no one knows the
other people he/she is playing with; they only know that the groups will remain
unchanged until the end of the session.
Each session is made of 10 rounds, plus 2 preliminary rounds which are identical
to the others except that in these rounds the subjects are not remunerated. At the
beginning of each round, each employer is given an endowment of 20 tokens and
each employee is given an endowment of 8 tokens. Each round is composed by three
phases:
1. In the first phase, each employer chooses the contract to be offered to both
her employees. The contract is composed by: an asked level of effort p∗, a
wage s, and a minimum wage smin that should be lower than the wage. The
asked effort should be within the range [0, 20], while both the wage and the
minimum wage should be within [0, 10].
2. In the second phase, each employee is told about the contract offered by his
employer, and then he is asked to exert a real effort for 90 seconds: that is, he
is asked to count the exact number of 1 in tables made by 0 and 1. After the
completion of this task, each of these three events can happen with the same
probability within each group: the number of tables completed by employee 1
is halved, the number of tables completed by employee 2 is halved, or none of
these events.
Before knowing which of these events will effectively happen, each employee
has to decide how to allocate his completed tables between himself and his
employer in each of the three hypothetical situations: meaning that he has to
decide how many tables keep for himself and how many tables give to the em-
ployer when 1) his tables are reduced 2) the tables completed by his coworker
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are reduced and 3) neither his tables nor the tables of his coworker are re-
duced. For each completed table he decides to keep for himself, he earns 0.4
tokens; for each completed table given to the matched employer, he does not
earn anything and the employer earns 0.6 tokens.
After this choice, each employee discovers which event has happened and con-
sequently which of his strategies has been implemented. The number of tables
effectively given to the employer by one employee represents his effort (p).
3. The employer observes how many tables each employee has effectively sent
her and the average number of tables completed by all the employees in the
previous round; moreover, she is aware about the possibility that the number
of tables completed by one of her employees is reduced, but she does not
discover which of the three above mentioned events has effectively happened.
After having observed the number of tables consigned by each employee, the
employer has to decide their individual wages:
• If the number of tables consigned by one employee is greater or equal to
the asked level of effort, the employer is forced to pay the higher wage s
to that employee.
• If the number of tables consigned by one employee is lower than the
asked level of effort, the employer has the possibility to choose between
the higher wage s and the minimum wage smin.
The employer is then asked to guess the total number of tables that each
of her employees wanted to keep. This elicitation of belief is incentivized,
meaning that, if the employer guess the right number of kept tables, she is
paid additional 1 token.
This is the end of phase three and the end of the round.
After 12 rounds, all the participants are asked to complete a questionnaire aimed
at investigating their propensity to risk (BRET; Crosetto and Filippin, 2012) and
they are asked few demographic questions; then their tokens are converted in money
with a conversion rate of 1 token = 0.05 euro and they are paid privately in a sep-
arate room.
Solidarity treatment:
The only difference between the Solidarity treatment and the Control treatment
is that in the Solidarity treatment, employees have the possibility to consign their
completed tables not only to the employer but also to the employee they are working
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with. That is, each employee has to decide how to allocate his own tables between
himself, the other employee, and the employer in the three possible situations (the
number of tables completed by employee 1 is halved, the number of tables completed
by employee 2 is halved, or none of these events). If the employee decides to give
some of the completed tables to his coworker, these tables are automatically sent
from the coworker to the employee: meaning that, the coworker can not decide to
keep them for himself. In this way, both the tables directly given to the employer
and those given to the coworker are substantially consigned to the employer: the
only difference among them is that the employer perceive the first ones as given by
the employee himself, and the second ones as given by his coworker. This is because
the employer is not aware if a tables’ exchange between her employees has taken
place nor, eventually, to which extent: she only knows that each of her employees
has the possibility to give some tables to his coworker, but she does not know if they
effectively do exploit that possibility.
Payoff
In both treatments, participants’ payoffs are determined in this way. Employers’
payoff is given by
Πemployer = 20− s1(smin1)− s2(smin2) + 0.6(p1 + p2)
where 20 is the initial endowment, s1 (smin1) and s2 (smin2) represent the wage
(minimum wage) given to employee 1 and to employee 2, p1 and p2 represent the
number of tables effectively received by employee 1 and by employee 2. On the other
hand, employees’ payoff is equal to:
Πemployee = 8 + s(smin) + 0.4(kt)
where 8 is the initial endowment, s (smin) represents the wage received and kt is the
number of tables that the employee decides to keep for himself.
3.3.2 Procedure
The experiment was run in the CEEL Lab at the University of Trento. The
experiment was completely computerized and it was programmed using oTree Soft-
ware (Chen et al., 2016). We conducted 8 experimental sessions, and 156 subjects
participated voluntarily: no subject participated in more than one treatment or ses-
sion. All the participants were undergraduate students, 62.8% were female, they
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were on average 21.6 years old, they have already participated on average in 5.9
experiments, and 47.3% of them were enrolled to an economics major. All the ex-
perimental subjects received a show up fee of 3 euro, and they earned an average
extra sum of 9.7 euro by participating in the experiment. Each session lasted about
1 hour and 30 minutes.
Before the beginning of each session, the participants were welcomed and they were
asked to seat randomly in the lab; then the instructions were read aloud by one
experimenter and the participants were asked to answer to some control question
in order to verify their comprehension. During each session they were not allowed
to chat nor to use their cellphones. In each period, each group was allowed to ob-
serve only the outcome of the group itself: the participants did not observe nor the
behavior nor the outcome of the participants outside their own group.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Proposed contracts
In the first stage of each round, each employer decides the contract to be offered
to her two employees: meaning that, she asks for a number a tables p∗, and she
decides how to remunerate them by choosing the minimum wage smin and the wage
s. Table 3.1 shows that the difference between the three contract components in CT
and in ST is almost irrelevant; however, we can see that in both treatments the pro-
posed minimum wage is higher than the absolute minimum wage, 0 (p-value<0.00
for both CT and ST, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). Since smin rep-
resents the minimum wage that the employer decides to pay to the employees no
matter what is the number of tables that she receives, this evidence seems to suggest
an attempt of inducing some kind of reciprocity in employees’ behavior.
Table 3.1: Contract offers by treatment
CT ST
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Wage 6.29 (1.55) 6.26 (2.01)
Minimum wage 0.52 (0.53) 0.68 (0.82)
Asked effort 15.24 (3.03) 16 (2.94)
Ratio of incentive-compatible p∗ 0.67 (0.37) 0.58 (0.39)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Figure 3.1: Total number of tables passed across periods
Result 1: The minimum offered wage is greater than 0 both in CT and in ST.
The other observation that we can draw from Table 3.1 is that the majority of
contracts, both in CT and in ST, are proposed in such a way that the wage is
appropriate for the asked number of tables: that is, s ≥ 0.4p∗. Nevertheless, the
ratio of the contracts in which p∗ is incentive-compatible is significantly higher in CT
than in ST (p= 0.05, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test): the interpretation
of this results could be that, since employers are aware of employees’ possibility of
exchanging tables, they are likely to ask for more tables being equal the offered wage.
Moreover, the amount of asked tables is found to increase over time: the average
number of asked tables in the last five rounds is significantly higher than the number
of tables asked in the first five rounds, both in CT and in ST (p= 0.03 both for CT
and ST, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). This result is probably driven by
the fact that, for each round, each employer is allowed to observe the average number
of tables completed by all the employees: since the average number of completed
tables is much higher than the average number of tables given to the employers (as
we will see in the next sub-sessions), employers ask few tables in the preliminary
rounds,4 and then they are likely to update their requests according to employees’
capabilities. On the other hand, the offered wages are stable across periods for both
treatments.
4The amount of tables asked in the preliminary rounds is significantly lower than that asked
in the other rounds (p-value = 0.01 in CT and p-value < 0.00 in ST, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test)
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Table 3.2: Number of passed tables by treatment
CT ST
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Own tables halved (empl.) 3.18 (2.21) 4.36 (2.76)
Coworker’s tables halved (empl.) 9.49 (4.32) 11.25 (4.38)
Tables not halved (empl.) 9.41 (4.21) 11.43 (4.6)
Effectively passed (empl.) 7.62 (1.88) 9.2 (2.17)
Own tables halved (cow.) 0.38 (0.64)
Coworker’s tables halved (cow.) 1.06 (1.2)
Tables not halved (cow.) 0.65 (1.38)
Effectively passed (cow.) 0.64 (0.35)
Total passed (empl.) 7.62 (1.88) 9.85 (1.88)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Result 2: Most of the offered contracts are such that s ≥ 0.4p∗, but in CT the
ratio of incentive-compatible p∗ is higher.
3.4.2 Effort levels
In our experimental design, the employee’s level of effort is represented by the
total number of tables that he effectively gives to the employer: Figure 3.1 depicts
the average number of tables passed to the employer across periods in CT and in
ST. Despite the time pattern is similar in the two treatments, we can clearly see that
the effort exerted in ST is higher than the effort exerted in CT in all the periods:
this remark is confirmed by a two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.04).
Result 3: The total number of tables effectively passed to the employer is always
higher in ST than in CT.
In both treatments, this number is determined by the number of tables that the
employee would like to give to the employer, and by the effect of the intervention of
the random device; moreover, in ST the number of tables given by one employee to
the employer is determined also by the number of tables that his coworker decides
to give him. Since the random device is made to hit employees with the same prob-
ability in CT and ST, our analysis will be focused on the other two components: the
number of tables directly given to the employer, and the number of tables received
by the coworker.
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Table 3.3: Tables passed to the employer (no interactions among coworkers)
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) 9.45∗ 4.50 4.78
(3.84) 4.18 (5.18)
Solidarity 1.73+ 1.78∗ 1.65+
(0.98) (0.88) (0.9)
Proposed wage 0.87∗∗∗
(0.12)
Completed tables 0.15
(0.09)
Incentive-compatible asked effort 2.85∗∗∗
(0.73)
Wage received in t-1 0.05
(0.08)
Tables passed by the coworker in t-1 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03)
R.sq.overall 0.03 0.08 0.08
Wald Chi(2) 12.26 74.17 63.57
Num. obs. 1030 1030 927
Random effects GLS (Standard error adjusted for clusters in group in parentheses)
Controls: age, nationality, major, gender, number of past experiments, guess about average number of
tables completed by the others. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, +p < 0.1
Table 3.2 shows, for both treatments, the average number of tables that the em-
ployees want to pass to the employer and to the coworker in the three hypothetical
situations (their own tables are halved, the tables of the coworker are halved, or none
of these events), the average number of tables effectively passed to the employer 5
and to the coworker according to the effects of the random device, and the total
number of tables passed to the employer. Since this last number is nothing but the
sum of the tables effectively passed to the employer plus those effectively received by
the coworker, in CT this number is equal to the number of tables effectively passed
to the employer because employees are not allowed to exchange tables. By looking
at this table it is easy to see that, when the employees are given the possibility to
show their solidarity with the coworkers in need, they tend to be more generous even
with their employers. Indeed, the number of tables effectively given to the employer
5This number is calculated without considering the possible exchange of tables between cowork-
ers in ST
65
3.4. RESULTS
Figure 3.2: Average number of tables passed to the coworker across periods
is higher in ST than in CT (p-value = 0.07, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test), and this is the first component of Result 3.
Result 3.1: When the employees are allowed to show their solidarity with their
coworkers, they tend to be more generous even with their employers.
The panel analysis presented in Table 3.3 confirms this result and provides some
insights into the drivers of employees’ decision on passing tables to the employer:
indeed, all the regressions show that the employees in the Solidarity treatment pass
around 1.7 more tables than those in the Control treatment. In column (2) we can
observe the well-known and well-proved positive relation between wage and effort;
moreover, the regression in column (3) shows that the number of passed tables is sig-
nificantly higher when the employer asks for an effort that is incentive-compatible.
The second evidence offered by column (3) is that employees’ behavior is positively
influenced by their peers’, as other experimental studies have proven before (Falk
and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009): that is, the number of tables passed by
one employee to the employer is slightly but positively influenced by the number
of tables passed by his coworker to the employer in the previous round. The peer
effect that we found is likely to be related to Result 3.1: that is, in ST employees
pass more tables to the employer because they want to overcome the comparison
with the coworkers, and they know that their coworkers’ performance is increased
by the tables that the employees themselves have passed them. Finally, employees’
behavior in one round does not seem to be influenced by the wage received in the
previous round.
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Table 3.4: Tables passed to the coworker
Random effects GLS
(Intercept) −2.42
(1.57)
Completed tables 0.00
(0.03)
Wage proposed 0.04∗
(0.02)
Asked tables −0.06+
(0.03)
Tables received by the coworker in t-1 0.17∗∗∗
(0.04)
R.sq.overall 0.21
Wald.Chi (2) 120.69
Num. obs. 486
Random effects GLS (Standard error adjusted for clusters in group in parentheses)
Controls: age, nationality, major, gender, number of past experiments, guess about average
number of tables completed by the others. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, +p < 0.1
The second component of Result 3, as we have already mentioned, is represented
by the number of tables received by the coworker. Table 3.2 provides us some cues
about employees’ behavior towards coworkers: the first evidence is that they do
exploit the possibility of helping coworker in all the hypothetical situations, and the
number of tables passed to the coworker is always higher than 0 (p-value<0.00 for
all the hypothetical situations, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).
Result 3.2: Employees do exploit the possibility of showing solidarity towards
their coworkers.
Moreover, employees’ solidarity is not tout court: indeed, Table 3.2 shows that
the number of tables given to the coworker when the tables of the coworker are
halved is higher than that given in the other two hypothetical situations (p-value <
0.00 for both hypothetical situations, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). It
means that employees pass significantly more tables to their coworkers when they
know that their coworkers are effectively in need; this situation resembles the classic
solidarity game context in which only the player who wins the lottery (the lucky
one) has the possibility to show his solidarity towards those who lose it (Selten and
Ockenfels, 1998; Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; Buchner et al., 2007).
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Figure 3.3: Probability of being punished as a function of the distance p∗ − p
Result 4: Employees pass significantly more tables to their coworkers when they
know that their coworkers are effectively in need.
If we look at the trend of the average number of tables effectively passed to the
coworker across periods in Figure 3.2 (therefore, considering the intervention of the
random device), it is easy to identify a decreasing pattern6. One possible inter-
pretation can be linked to conditional cooperation: an employee is willing to show
solidarity towards the coworker as long as the coworker is reciprocating his help.
Therefore, as time goes by, the initial solidarity of some employees tends to disap-
pear because they meet some selfish coworkers that do not reciprocate the initial
help. The negative reciprocity is confirmed also by the regression shown in Table
3.4: indeed, it is clear that the number of tables received by the coworker in t-1
strongly and positively influences the number of tables passed to the coworker in t.
Moreover, and not surprisingly, it shows that employees tend to pass less table to
their coworkers when they are asked to exert higher effort. Finally, the number of
tables given to the coworker is positively influenced by the wage proposed by the
employer: meaning that, when employees know that they have the possibility to
earn an high wage, they are probably more willing to renounce to a part of their
tables to help their coworkers.
Result 5: Employees’ solidarity is influenced by their reciprocity towards cowork-
ers.
6This pattern can be easily linked to the decay in contribution that has been observed by several
studies on public good games (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011).
68
3.4. RESULTS
Table 3.5: Determinants of punishment
(1) (2)
(Intercept) 0.47∗∗ −2.13
(0.15) (3.13)
Solidarity 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
(p∗ - p) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
(p∗ - p) in t-1 - −0.004∗
(0.00)
(p∗ - p) coworker - −0.006∗∗
(0.00)
R.sq.overall 0.14 0.19
Wald Chi(2) 40.25 46.09
Num. obs. 605 536
Random effects GLS (Standard error adjusted for clusters in group in parentheses).
Controls: age, nationality, major, gender, number of past experiments, guess about
average number of tables completed by the others.
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, +p < 0.1
3.4.3 Punishment behavior
The final move of each round is up to the employers: they have to decide how
to remunerate their employees, and they are allowed to punish one of them only if
they receive from that employee a number of tables lower than that asked. The first
result that stands out is that employers punish non-compliant employees almost all
the times that they are allowed to (86% of the times for CT and 90% for ST, no
statistical difference) and the probability of being punished is stable across rounds
for both treatments (comparing the first five rounds and the last five rounds we do
not find statistical differences). 7 However, not all the non-compliant employees
have the same probability of being punished: indeed, Figure 3.3 shows that the
probability of being punished is strictly linked to the distance between the asked
number of tables and the number of tables effectively consigned. Table 3.5 confirms
7It should be noticed that the probability of being punished is much lower in the preliminary
rounds than in the other rounds (p-value <0.01 for both treatments, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test); this results is related to the fact that subjects receive no payment for the preliminary
rounds, and those employers who renounce to their possibility to punish are probably attempting
to induce their employees to reciprocate in the successive rounds.
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Figure 3.4: Employees’ reaction to punishment across periods
the causal link between the distance between the asked effort and the exerted one,
and the probability of being punished. Furthermore, column (2) sheds some light
on the other determinants of this probability: indeed, it shows that the probability
of being punished decreases as long as the difference in effort (p∗ - p) provided by
the coworker increases, and as long as the difference in effort (p∗ - p) provided by
the employee in t-1 is high. It seems to suggest that employers consider coworkers’
behavior and employees’ behavior in the previous round as a reference point: for
example, if employers are aware that also in t-1 the employee failed in reaching the
objective, or that neither the coworker was able to reach it, they can think that they
asked too many tables and they are less willing to punish the non-compliance.
Result 6: Employers exploit the possibility of punishing their non-compliant
employees almost all the times, both in CT and in ST.
One possible reason that lead employers to not overlook employees’ non-compliance
can be guessed by looking at the reactions to punishment. The y-axis of Figure 3.4
represents the difference in number of tables consigned to the employer between t-1
and t of those employees whose effort in t-1 was lower than that asked; therefore,
the bars show the difference in effort of those who have been punished (light gray)
and of those who have not been punished (dark gray). It is easy to see that in all the
periods those employees who are punished for their non-compliance tend to increase
more (or decrease less) their effort from t-1, the period in which they are punished,
to t; this difference in effort is significant both in CT and in ST (p-value<0.00 for
both treatments, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). Therefore, by looking
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Figure 3.5: Employers’ and employees’ earnings across periods
at the consequences of their behavior, employers learn that punishment is the best
option to induce employees to exert higher effort (reinforcement learning, Sutton and
Barto, 1998). To conclude, it becomes more efficient for the employers to punish
non-compliant employees for two reasons: firstly, they save some money by paying
them a lower wage; and secondly, employees tend to exert higher effort after being
punished.
3.4.4 Earnings
Finally, let us give a look at how employers’ and employees’ earnings differ across
treatments. Figure 3.5 shows that employers’ payoffs are much higher than employ-
ees’ in all the periods in both treatments, and this difference becomes even stronger
in ST with respect to CT. Indeed, employers’ payoffs in ST are significantly higher
than employers’ payoff in CT (p-value < 0.00, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test) and employees’ payoffs in ST are significantly lower than employees’ payoff in
CT (p-value <0.00, two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test). The determinants
of this evidence are at least threefold: first of all, employees complete almost the
same number of tables in CT and in ST (22.5 in CT and 22.7 in ST, p-value= 0.7
two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test); despite this, in ST the number of tables
directly given to the employer is higher than that given in CT; and finally, in ST
employees give some tables even to their coworker, and these are indirectly passed
to the employer.
71
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
3.5 Concluding remarks
The main goal of this study was to explore whether people are moved also by
solidarity concerns when they interact with peers in need into a workplace context;
moreover, by mimicking the cash posters’ framework à la Homans, it tested the
gift-exchange between employers and employees, both in terms of wage-effort and
in terms of effort-potential leniency. In order to pursue these aims, we proposed a
novel experimental design in which subjects are assigned either the role of employer
or employee, and each employer is matched with two employees; they are asked
to play a modified gift-exchange game with punishment, in which each employer
proposes a contract (composed by a minimum wage, a wage and an asked level of
production), and each employee is asked to exert a real effort that is nothing but
counting the number of 1 in a series of tables. For each correctly counted table the
employees are allowed to decide either to keep it for themselves, and receive a small
payment, or to pass it to their employer; after this decision, the number of tables
they decided to give to the employer risks to be reduced by a random device. If an
employee’s final effort8 is at least equal to that asked, the employer is forced to pay
him the regular wage; if the effort is lower than that asked, the employer can choose
to pay him the regular or the minimum wage. In our treatment, each employee has
the possibility to help the coworker in need by renouncing to a part of his tables and
giving it to the coworker, in order to prevent his needy peer receiving the minimum
wage.
We did find some behaviors driven by that reciprocity that is widely-proved to
characterize gift-exchange games (Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr et al.,
2007): indeed, employers offer a minimum wage that is significantly higher than
the minimum possible and employees’ effort is strongly influenced by the proposed
wage. Nevertheless, employers do not seem to be willing to overlook employees’
non-compliance, neither when the employee exerted a high effort in the past, nor
when his coworker exerts a high effort; therefore, we did not find any evidence of the
twofold leniency in the work rules that Akerlof (1982) ascribed to the firm’s behavior
in the cash poster framework. One possible reason of this result can be related to
the artificial time compression that is typical of lab experiments, and that makes
the link between punishment and employees’ behavior much more salient than that
observed in the Homans’ framework. This unwillingness to forgive non-compliant
8By final effort we mean the number of tables given by one employee to the employer after the
intervention of the random device.
72
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
employees can be also linked to the consequences of forgiveness: indeed, when em-
ployees are not punished for their non-compliance in one round, they tend to exert
even less effort in the next round, while punishment is an effective tool for increasing
employees’ performance.
When employees are allowed to show their solidarity towards the coworker in
need, they effectively exploit this possibility, and this result is in line with the previ-
ous evidence on people’s behavior in the solidarity game (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998;
Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999; de Oliveira et al., 2014); it means that, despite the
workplace context and the fact that subjects have to work before deciding whether
to provide help or not, solidarity concerns still hold. It is worthwhile to underline
that the interactions among employees are shaped not only by solidarity concerns,
but also by reciprocity: that is, one employee is willing to help his coworker as long
as the coworker reciprocates this help. Further development of this research should
be focused on disentangling reciprocity from solidarity concerns, in order to explore
whether people still help peers in need without expecting anything back.
Another result of our treatment is that employees not just show their solidarity
towards their peers, but they are also willing to exert higher effort towards their
employers. This finding is undoubtedly counterintuitive: indeed, since employees
complete approximately the same number of tables in both treatments and in the
solidarity treatment they renounce to a part of them to help the coworker, by giving
more tables to the employers in the solidarity treatment they end up with keeping
less tables for themselves. One possible interpretation of this result could be related
to the observed positive link between the number of tables given by one employee
to the employer in one round, and the number of tables given by his coworker in
the previous round: since employees’ performance is influenced by a peer effect,
and in solidarity treatment each employee knows that his coworker’s performance
is increased by the tables that the employee himself has passed him, in order to
overcome the comparison with the coworker each employee should pass even more
tables to the employer.
As a consequence, the gap between employers’ and employees’ payoffs became
even greater in the solidarity treatment: indeed, employers’ payoffs increase and em-
ployees’ payoffs decrease with respect to the control treatment. This is due to the
fact that employees take the opportunity to show their solidarity towards coworkers,
and exert higher effort even towards their employers: on the other side, employers
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exploit this situation and ask for more effort without increasing the offered wage nor
their willingness to forgive non-compliance. We can also hypothesize that solidarity
among coworkers can be even increased by employers’ exploiting behavior, and that
employees tend to help one another to face together the "mean" employer; posit that
the employer is able to predict this behavior, he is likely to became even more severe
to induce more solidarity. This result may have some nice implications in real-world
organizations: indeed, by creating a climate and a structure that allow employees
to help each other in performing the requested tasks, employers are likely to create
the foundations for a collaboration that could be advantageous especially for them-
selves. Furthermore, we hypothesize that in a context in which the employees know
each other and the employer is made aware of the possible solidarity among them,
employees are even more likely to help each other in the hope of determining a sort
of reciprocal behavior from the employer.
To summarize, the main conclusion that we can draw from our results is that employ-
ees’ behavior seems to be moved also by solidarity concerns, and that the employ-
ers are the major beneficiaries of this driver. Further investigation could certainly
help in disentangling solidarity from reciprocity concerns, for example by using a
strangers matching protocol instead a partners one; moreover, it should be explored
whether our main results hold when the number of employees is higher, and whether
solidarity concerns might interact with some sort of intrinsic motivation.
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The aim of this dissertation was to explore some motivational forces that are less
evident than monetary rewards, but still very powerful in driving human behavior:
intrinsic motivation and solidarity towards peers.
Chapter 1 explores how intrinsically motivated subjects are influenced by the
presence of others motivational factors, in particular: 1) external interventions (such
as monetary incentives, fines, control devices, feedbacks, and so on) 2) social con-
text 3) subjects’ identity and identification with their task, job, firm 4) their goals,
both in terms of their personal achievement motives and in terms of externally set
goals. We decided to begin with a review chapter in order to provide the reader
with an overall picture of the complex phenomenon of intrinsic motivation; indeed,
it risks to result really tricky to deal with this motivation, especially when it is not
the only driver of subjects’ behavior. A better understanding of the effects of these
interactions could help in developing a total reward system that is able to maintain,
and even increase, employees’ intrinsic motivation: indeed, money appears to be not
always the best answer to motivational problems, and sometimes can even become
detrimental to motivation. This result suggests the need to insert monetary incen-
tives within a broader context of rewards that takes account of the above-mentioned
psychological motives, and to resort to them only in the understanding of their in-
terplay with the other motivational drivers.
The laboratory experiment presented in Chapter 2 investigates the relation be-
tween intrinsic motivation, wage delegation and performance. The aim of this study
was indeed to test whether subjects who are given the possibility to determine their
own wage perceive an increase in intrinsic motivation; in addition, it tested also
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whether heterogeneously motivated subjects react to wage delegation in different
ways. Our findings show that subjects exert higher effort when they are delegated
the wage choice, and the best performers are those who are both highly motivated
and delegated their wage choice. These results suggest that, in order to obtain the
highest benefits from a strategy aimed at allowing employees to have more auton-
omy, it is important to contextualize it in a framework that facilitates their intrinsic
motivation. Nevertheless, wage delegation does not seem to influence subjects’ in-
trinsic motivation; we will see in the next sub-session some possible explanations
and further research.
Chapter 3 is focused on another internal motivation of human behavior: soli-
darity towards peers. Indeed, it illustrates a laboratory experiment with a modified
gift-exchange game aimed at investigating not only reciprocity concerns within the
employer-employee relation, but also solidarity among coworkers. Our results con-
firm the existence of reciprocity, at least in terms of wage-effort relation; moreover,
they suggest that also solidarity can play an important role in determining subjects’
behavior, since employees are proved to be willing to help the coworkers in need,
especially when they have received some help from them in the past. Unexpectedly,
when employees are allowed to show their solidarity concerns, they become more
generous even towards their employers: consequently, the greatest beneficiaries of
solidarity concerns appear to be employers. Especially this last result suggests not
to underestimate the importance of this not so explored motivation: indeed, by sim-
ply allowing employees to help one another it is possible to generate greater wealth,
even if its distribution becomes more unequal.
Limitations and further research
As we have already mentioned, this doctoral dissertation relies mainly on labo-
ratory evidence: the review presented in Chapter 1 illustrates mostly the results of
laboratory experiments, while Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 present the findings of two
novel laboratory experiments. The reason for this choice is that laboratory experi-
ments seem to be advantageous for one main reason: in a laboratory setting is easier
to disentangle the different psychological motives driving subjects’ behavior, while
in a field setting they can be only inferred from the observation of subjects’ actions
or derived from questionnaires compiled by the subjects themselves. Of course, our
laboratory findings can not be generalized tout court to real world scenarios, but
they can still give some cues about the real determinants of human behavior; how-
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ever, our results would certainly be stronger and more reliable if supported by field
study evidence. Moreover, both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 would surely benefit from
the collection of more observations.
In the experiment illustrated by Chapter 2 we used two different measures of
intrinsic motivation: a behavioral measure before our treatment, and a self-assessed
measure after our treatment. In order to make them comparable, it might be ap-
propriate to use twice the same measure, the behavioral one, both before and after
the treatment; in doing so, maybe we can obtain different results for what concerns
the effect of the treatment on the ex-post measure of intrinsic motivation. Another
limitation of this design is related to our choice to exclude the principal from the
setting in order to let the subjects play individually: even if this choice allowed us
to disentangle reciprocity from wage delegation effects, the lack of the principal is
likely to prevent the subjects from perceiving wage delegation as an intervention
aimed at recognizing their autonomy and competence.
Finally, Chapter 3 might be improved with a treatment with a strangers match-
ing protocol instead of a partners matching, in order to disentangle solidarity among
coworker from reciprocity. Another useful integration might be related to the num-
ber of workers connected to the same employer: indeed, the increase of the number
of coworkers is likely to generate an interesting mechanism for determining who
should help whom.
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INSTRUCTIONS
Since the experiment was conducted in Trento, the original instructions were in
Italian. This is a translated version.
Good morning and thank you for your participation to this experiment!
You are going to take part in an experiment with scientific purposes. First of all,
please read carefully the instructions that we gave to you; an experimenter will read
them aloud. After that, please answer to the control questions that you will find at
the end of the instructions. After all participants have answered to these questions,
one experimenter will read aloud the correct answers. Please check whether your
answers were correct or not. May you have any doubts, do not hesitate to ask!
During the experiment, you will receive an amount of money according to a
procedure that you will be told in a while. In addition, you will receive 3 euro for
arriving on time. During the experiment, your payment will be calculated in tokens
with a conversion rate of:
1 token = 0.25 euro
The experiment is characterized by anonymity. During the experiment, you will
not be allowed to talk to other participants; otherwise, you will be excluded from
the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to respond to a
brief questionnaire; after that, you will be paid in cash in a private room.
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Phases:
The experiment is composed by two phases.
In both phases, you will be asked to complete a task which consists of writing words
according to the following procedure. On your screen there will be four boxes, each
of them corresponding to one category: movies, flora & fauna, food & beverage, and
forenames. At the beginning of each phase, on the top of the screen there will be a
letter, and every three minutes this letter will be replaced by another one (different
from the previous one). Your task is to write down as many words as you can that
have to be related to one of the four categories, and have to begin with the letter
given in that moment. After three minutes, a new letter will appear on the top of
the screen, and the words you write down will have to begin with this new letter.
For example, if the letter on your screen is G, you will have to write down as many
words as you can that have to begin with letter G and have to be related to one of
the above mentioned categories. In order to write a new word, it will be sufficient
to insert it in the designated box and then push the bottom OK.
This first phase will last for 15 minutes.
At the end of the first phase, the screen will show you the number of correct words
that you will have inserted: this number represents your performance. Misspelled
words, words that do not begin with the given letter or that are not related to the
category in which you want to insert them, will be considered incorrect and will
be not taken in consideration to compute your performance. If you try to insert
an incorrect word, the sentence WORD NOT FOUND will appear on your screen,
and it will prevent you from inserting the word. While you are completing the task,
please remember the following rules:
• Only Italian words will be considered for computing the performance.
• Abbreviations and uncompleted forms will not be considered for computing
the performance.
• Similar (but different) words will be considered separately for computing the
performance.
• Capital letters will not influence words’ correctness.
• Stressed words will not be considered for computing the performance. In order
to write them correctly, it is necessary to write them without stress.
• If the same word is written twice in the same category, or in different categories,
only one of these two forms will be considered for computing the performance.
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• For what concerns movies category, the only punctuation marks allowed are:
dot (.), comma (,), colon (:), exclamation mark (!), question mark (?), and
ampersand (&). Only entirely written titles will be considered for computing
the performance.
• For what concerns flora & fauna category, only singular forms will be consid-
ered for computing the performance.
• For what concerns food & beverage category, only singular forms will be con-
sidered for computing the performance, except from pasta shapes that are
correct only in the plural form.
• For what concerns forenames category, only Italian forenames will be consid-
ered for computing the performance; moreover, compound forenames will be
considered correct only if they are written as an unique word.
Example: letter G
(We substitute the original version of the example, that was in Italian, with a re-
adapted example in English, in order to preserve its effectiveness)
Movies Correct? Flora&fauna Correct?
Gomorrah Yes Goat Yes
gangs of new york Yes Goats No
gangs No goose+ only one
ghostbuster* only one German Pinscher Yes
ghostbuster* only one German Shepherd Yes
ghostbusters 2 Yes
G.I. Joe: retalia-
tion
Yes
G.I. Joe- retalia-
tion
No
Food&beverage Correct? Forenames Correct?
grapefruit Yes giulia Yes
grapefruits No Giancarlo Yes
gnocco No Gian carlo No
gnocchi Yes Gregory No
goose+ only one
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gangs = it is the shortened version of ’gangs of new york’, therefore it is incorrect;
ghostbusters, ghostbusters = it is the same word repeated in the same category,
only one of them will be considered for computing the performance;
ghostbusters 2 = it is similar to ghostbusters, but they are different movies; there-
fore, they will both be considered for computing the performance;
G.I Joe- retaliation= there is a punctuation mark that is not allowed, therefore it
will not be considered for computing the performance;
goats = it is a plural form, therefore it will not be considered for computing the
performance;
goose (Flora & fauna), goose (Food and beverage) = it is the same word repeated in
different categories, only one of them will be considered for computing the perfor-
mance;
German Pinscher, German Shepherd = they are similar but different forms, there-
fore they will both be considered for computing the performance;
grapefruit, grapefruits = only grapefruit is correct because it is the singular form;
gnocco, gnocchi = the correct form is gnocchi because it is a shape of pasta;
Gian carlo = it is a compound forename written with two separate words, therefore
it will not be considered for computing the performance;
Gregory = it is not an Italian forename, therefore it will not be considered for com-
puting the performance;
During the task completion, for each letter your screen will show you the re-
maining time for inserting words, which words you have already inserted and your
performance, that is the number of correct words inserted.
At the end of phase 1 you will receive a fixed payment of 20 tokens, therefore your
payment will not depend on your performance.
At the end of phase 1, and before the beginning of phase 2, you will be asked
to wait for 6 minutes; during these minutes you will have the possibility to keep on
performing the task, play tetris, or simply wait for the beginning of the next phase.
You will not be remunerated for this phase.
After 6 minutes, phase 2 will begin. The task of phase 2 is absolutely identical to
that of phase 1, and also phase 2 lasts for 15 minutes.
For Control Treatment:
For completing phase 2, you will receive a fixed payment within a range between 0
and 30 tokens; this payment will be determined through a random process before
the beginning of phase two. Therefore, you will know your remuneration for phase
81
APPENDIX A
2 only after the end of phase 1, and before the beginning pf phase 2. Your final
payment will be equal to 3 euro for your participation + 20 tokens for phase 1 +
the random payment for phase 2.
The experiment will end after phase 2.
For Delegation Treatment:
Before the beginning of phase 2, you will be asked to decide your own payment for
that phase. You will have the possibility to opt for an amount included within a
range between 0 and 30 tokens. Your final payment will be equal to 3 euro for your
participation + 20 tokens for phase 1 + the payment you ask for phase 2.
The experiment will end after phase 2.
CONTROL QUESTION:
Before the beginning of the experiment, please answer the following questions in
order to verify whether you comprehend the instructions.
1. During phase 1, player A writes 23 correct words and player B writes 40 correct
words. Which is the player who receives the highest payment? Why?
2. (For Control Treatment) Before the beginning of phase 2, you are told that
you will receive 25 tokens for completing the task in phase 2. Which is the
total amount of money that you receive for the experiment? (For Delegation
Treatment) Before the beginning of phase 2, you ask to be paid 25 tokens for
completing the task in phase 2. Which is the total amount of money that you
receive for the experiment?
3. Check whether these forms are correct or not: Giraffes, george, gattaca, Go-
rilla, garlic.
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This is a translated version of the original questionnaire, which was in Italian.
We created this questionnaire starting from the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI)
(Ryan, 1982).
FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE
For each of the following statements, please indicate how much do you agree,
using the following scale:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I strongly
disagree
I some-
what
agree
I strongly
agree
1. While I was doing this activity, I was thinking about how much I enjoyed it.
2. This activity did not hold my attention at all.
3. I thought this activity was quite enjoyable.
4. I think I did pretty well at this activity, compared to other students.
5. I thought this was a boring activity.
6. I enjoyed doing this activity very much.
7. I would describe this activity as very interesting.
8. I am satisfied with my performance at this task.
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9. After working at this activity for awhile, I felt pretty competent.
10. I think I am pretty good at this activity.
11. This activity was fun to do.
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INSTRUCTIONS
Since the experiment was conducted in Trento, the original instructions were in
Italian. This is a translated version.
CONTROL TREATMENT
Good morning and thank you for your participation to this experiment!
You are going to take part in an experiment with scientific purposes. Please read
carefully the instructions that we gave to you; an experimenter will read them aloud.
May you have any doubts, don’t hesitate to ask!
During the experiment, you will have the possibility to earn an amount of money
according to a procedure that you will be told in a while. In addition, you will
receive 3 euro for arriving on time. During the experiment, your payment will be
calculated in tokens with a conversion rate of:
1 token = 0.05 euro
The experiment is characterized by anonymity. During the experiment, you are
not allowed to talk to other participants nor to use your phone; otherwise, you will
be excluded from the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be asked
to respond to a brief questionnaire; after that, you will be paid in cash in a private
room.
General informations:
Participants will be randomly assigned the role of employer or employee. At the
beginning of the experiment you will find out which will be your role, and you will
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maintain the same role throughout the entire experiment. Participants will be then
randomly assigned to groups that consist of three people: two employees and one
employer. You will not know the identity of the other components of your group,
and they will not know yours.
Rounds:
The experiment consists of ten identical rounds. Before the proper experiment
begins, there will be two trial rounds that will be absolutely identical to the ex-
perimental rounds, except that participants will not be paid for these two rounds.
When the proper experiment begins, groups formed during the trial rounds will be
separated and participants will be randomly rematched in new groups. The new
groups will remain unchanged until the end of the experiment: it means that you
will interact with the same people for all the rest of the experiment. Participants’
role will not change after the trial rounds: meaning that, those who are employees
in the trial rounds keep on being employees also in the proper rounds, and those
who are employers in the trial rounds keep on being employers also in the proper
rounds.
After the trial rounds, your earnings for each round will depend on your decisions
and on the decisions of the participants you will be grouped with. At the beginning
of each round, each employer will receive an endowment of 20 tokens, while each
employee will receive an endowment of 8 tokens. Each round consists of three stages.
Stage 1: the contract
Each employer will have the possibility to choose the contract to be proposed to
both her employees. The contract is composed by: an asked level of effort p∗, a
wage s, and a minimum wage smin that should be lower than the wage. The asked
effort should be within the range [0, 20], while both the wage and the minimum
wage should be within [0, 10].
Stage 2: the production
Each employee will be told about the contract offered by his employer; then a se-
quence of tables made by 0 and 1 will appear on his screen, and he will be asked to
count the exact number of 1 in each table. This task will last 90 seconds.
During these 90 seconds, employers will be given the possibility to play "snake", but
their performance will not influence their earnings.
After 90 seconds, each of these three events can happen with the same proba-
bility within each group: the number of tables completed by employee 1 is halved,
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the number of tables completed by employee 2 is halved, or none of these events. It
means that for example, if employee 1 has completed 6 tables during the production
phase, there is a probability equal to 13 that his production is halved and he has
only 3 tables at his disposal.
BEFORE knowing which of these events will effectively happen, each employee
has to decide how many tables keep for himself and how many tables give to the
employer in each of the three possible situations, meaning 1) if his tables are reduced
2) if the tables completed by his coworker are reduced and 3) if neither his tables nor
the tables of his coworker are reduced. For each completed table he decides to keep
for himself, he will earn 0.4 tokens; for each completed table given to the matched
employer, the employer will earn 0.6 tokens.
After this choice, each employee will discover which event has effectively hap-
pened and consequently which of his three potential strategies will be implemented.
The number of tables effectively given to the employer by one employee represents
the employee’s level of production (p).
Stage 3: the payment of the wage
In this stage each employer will observe how many tables each employee has effec-
tively sent her, but she will not discover which of the three events has effectively
happened (whether the number of tables completed by employee 1 is halved, the
number of tables completed by employee 2 is halved, or none of these events).
Moreover, she will be told about the average number of tables completed by all
the employees in the previous round.
If the number of tables consigned by one employee to the employer is greater or
equal to the asked level of effort (p∗), the employer will be forced to pay the higher
wage s to that employee; on the other hand, if the number of tables consigned by
one employee to the employer is lower than the asked level of effort (p∗), the em-
ployer will have the possibility to choose whether to pay him the higher wage s or
the minimum wage smin. The employer will have the possibility to pay a different
wage to her employees.
The employer will be then asked to guess the total number of tables that each
of her employees wanted to keep; if the employer guess the right number of kept
tables, she will be paid additional 1 token. This is the end of stage three and the
end of the round.
At the end of each round, each participant will be told about everything hap-
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pened in that round, the payment he obtained, and the cumulative payment that he
has obtained up to that round. The rules used to calculate participant’s earnings are
summarized in the session Earnings per round. After 12 rounds, all the participants
will be asked to complete a questionnaire; then their tokens will be converted in
money, and they will be paid privately in a separate room.
Earnings per round
Employee’s earnings = 8 + s(smin) + 0.4(number of kept tables)
Employer’s earnings = 20 - s1(smin1) - s2(smin2) + 0.6(p1 + p2)
s1 (smin1) and s2 (smin2) represent the wage/minimum wage given to employee 1
and to employee 2; p1 and p2 represent the number of tables effectively received by
employee 1 and by employee 2.
EXAMPLE:
The employer proposes a contract composed by p∗ = 10, s = 8, smin = 0.
Both employee 1 and employee 2 complete 20 tables.
The number of tables completed by employee 1 are halved, therefore employee 1 has
only 10 tables. Employee 1 decides to give 10 tables to the employer and he does
not keep anything for himself; employee 2 decides to give 5 tables to the employer
and to keep 15 tables for himself.
The employer decides to pay the minimum wage smin = 0 to employee 2, while
employee 1 receives a wage equal to s = 8.
Earnings:
Employee 1 = 8+ 8 = 16
Employee 2 = 8 + 0 + 0.4*15 = 8 + 6 = 14
Employer = 20 - 8 – 0 + 0,6*(10+5) = 12 + 9 = 21
CONTROL QUESTION:
The employer proposes a contract composed by p∗ = 12, s = 8, smin = 1.
Employee 1 completes 16 tables, and employee 2 completes 13 tables. Neither the
number of tables completed by employee 1 nor the number of tables completed by
employee 2 is halved. Employee 1 decides to give 3 tables to the employer and to
keep for himself 13 tables; employee 2 gives 13 tables to the employer and he does
not keep anything for himself. The employer decides to pay the minimum wage
smin = 1 to employee 1, while employee 1 receives a wage equal to s = 8. Which are
the participants’ earnings?
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SOLIDARITY TREATMENT
Good morning and thank you for your participation to this experiment!
You are going to take part in an experiment with scientific purposes. Please read
carefully the instructions that we gave to you; an experimenter will read them aloud.
May you have any doubts, don’t hesitate to ask!
During the experiment, you will have the possibility to earn an amount of money
according to a procedure that you will be told in a while. In addition, you will
receive 3 euro for arriving on time. During the experiment, your payment will be
calculated in tokens with a conversion rate of:
1 token = 0.05 euro
The experiment is characterized by anonymity. During the experiment, you are
not allowed to talk to other participants nor to use your phone; otherwise, you will
be excluded from the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be asked
to respond to a brief questionnaire; after that, you will be paid in cash in a private
room.
General informations:
Participants will be randomly assigned the role of employer or employee. At the
beginning of the experiment you will find out which will be your role, and you will
maintain the same role throughout the entire experiment. Participants will be then
randomly assigned to groups that consist of three people: two employees and one
employer. You will not know the identity of the other components of your group,
and they will not know yours.
Rounds:
The experiment consists of ten identical rounds. Before the proper experiment
begins, there will be two trial rounds that will be absolutely identical to the ex-
perimental rounds, except that participants will not be paid for these two rounds.
When the proper experiment begins, groups formed during the trial rounds will be
separated and participants will be randomly rematched in new groups. The new
groups will remain unchanged until the end of the experiment: it means that you
will interact with the same people for all the rest of the experiment. Participants’
role will not change after the trial rounds: meaning that, those who are employees
in the trial rounds keep on being employees also in the proper rounds, and those
who are employers in the trial rounds keep on being employers also in the proper
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rounds.
After the trial rounds, your earnings for each round will depend on your decisions
and on the decisions of the participants you will be grouped with. At the beginning
of each round, each employer will receive an endowment of 20 tokens, while each
employee will receive an endowment of 8 tokens. Each round consists of three stages.
Stage 1: the contract
Each employer will have the possibility to choose the contract to be proposed to
both her employees. The contract is composed by: an asked level of effort p∗, a
wage s, and a minimum wage smin that should be lower than the wage. The asked
effort should be within the range [0, 20], while both the wage and the minimum
wage should be within [0, 10].
Stage 2: the production
Each employee will be told about the contract offered by his employer; then a se-
quence of tables made by 0 and 1 will appear on his screen, and he will be asked to
count the exact number of 1 in each table. This task will last 90 seconds.
During these 90 seconds, employers will be given the possibility to play "snake", but
their performance will not influence their earnings.
After 90 seconds, each of these three events can happen with the same proba-
bility within each group: the number of tables completed by employee 1 is halved,
the number of tables completed by employee 2 is halved, or none of these events. It
means that for example, if employee 1 has completed 6 tables during the production
phase, there is a probability equal to 13 that his production is halved and he has
only 3 tables at his disposal.
BEFORE knowing whether his tables will be effectively halved or not, each
employee has to decide how many tables keep for himself, how many tables give
to the other employee, and how many tables give to the employer in each of the
three possible situations: meaning that he has to decide how many tables to give
and how many to keep 1) if his tables are reduced 2) if the tables completed by his
coworker are reduced and 3) if neither his tables nor the tables of his coworker are
reduced. If he decides to give one or more tables to his coworker, his coworker will
not have the possibility to keep these tables for himself, but rather these tables will
be automatically sent from the coworker to the employer. Consequently:
90
APPENDIX C
Tables received by the employer from emp1: tables consigned by emp1 +
tables consigned by emp2 to emp1
Tables received by the employer from emp2: tables consigned by emp2 +
tables consigned by emp1 to emp2
For each completed table the employee decides to keep for himself, he will earn 0.4
tokens; for each completed table given to the matched employer or to his coworker,
the employer will earn 0.6 tokens.
After this choice, each employee will discover which event has effectively hap-
pened and consequently which of his three potential strategies will be implemented.
The number of tables effectively given to the employer by one employee represents
the employee’s level of production (p), and it is composed by: the number of tables
given by employee 1 to the employer + the number of tables given by employee 2
to employee 1.
Stage 3: the payment of the wage
In this stage each employer will observe how many tables each employee has effec-
tively sent her, but she will not discover which of the three events has effectively
happened (whether the number of tables completed by employee 1 is halved, the
number of tables completed by employee 2 is halved, or none of these events). Each
employer will have the possibility to see only the total number of tables that each
employee has sent her, but she will not see whether there was a tables exchange
among workers. Moreover, she will be told about the average number of tables com-
pleted by all the employees in the previous round.
If the number of tables consigned by one employee to the employer is greater or
equal to the asked level of effort (p∗), the employer will be forced to pay the higher
wage s to that employee; on the other hand, if the number of tables consigned by
one employee to the employer is lower than the asked level of effort (p∗), the em-
ployer will have the possibility to choose whether to pay him the higher wage s or
the minimum wage smin. The employer will have the possibility to pay a different
wage to her employees.
The employer will be then asked to guess the total number of tables that each
of her employees wanted to keep; if the employer guess the right number of kept
tables, she will be paid additional 1 token. This is the end of stage three and the
end of the round.
At the end of each round, each participant will be told about everything hap-
pened in that round, the payment he obtained, and the cumulative payment that he
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has obtained up to that round. The rules used to calculate participant’s earnings are
summarized in the session Earnings per round. After 12 rounds, all the participants
will be asked to complete a questionnaire; then their tokens will be converted in
money, and they will be paid privately in a separate room.
Earnings per round
Employee’s earnings = 8 + s(smin) + 0.4(number of kept tables)
Employer’s earnings = 20 - s1(smin1) - s2(smin2) + 0.6(p1 + p2)
s1 (smin1) and s2 (smin2) represent the wage/minimum wage given to employee 1
and to employee 2; p1 and p2 represent the number of tables effectively received by
employee 1 and by employee 2.
EXAMPLE:
The employer proposes a contract composed by p∗ = 10, s = 8, smin = 0.
Both employee 1 and employee 2 complete 18 tables.
The number of tables completed by employee 1 are halved, therefore employee 1 has
only 9 tables. Employee 1 decides to give 9 tables to the employer, 0 to employee
2, and he does not keep anything for himself; employee 2 decides to give 7 tables to
the employer, 2 to employee 1, and to keep 9 tables for himself.
The employer decides to pay the minimum wage smin = 0 to employee 2, while
employee 1 receives a wage equal to s = 8.
Earnings:
Employee 1 = 8+ 8 = 16
Employee 2 = 8 + 0 + 0.4*9 = 8 + 3.6 = 11.6
Employer = 20 - 8 – 0 + 0.6*((9+2) + (7+0)) = 12 + 10.8 = 22.8
CONTROL QUESTION:
The employer proposes a contract composed by p∗ = 12, s = 8, smin = 1.
Employee 1 completes 16 tables, and employee 2 completes 13 tables. Neither the
number of tables completed by employee 1 nor the number of tables completed by
employee 2 is halved. Employee 1 decides to give 3 tables to the employer, 1 to
employee2, and to keep for himself 12 tables; employee 2 gives 11 tables to the em-
ployer, 2 to employee1, and he does not keep anything for himself. The employer
decides to pay the minimum wage smin = 1 to employee 1, while employee 1 receives
a wage equal to s = 8. Which are the participants’ earnings?
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